Dynamic utility: The sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation: The sixth reciprocity rule

Hiromu Ito, Jun Tanimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.

Original languageEnglish
Article number200891
JournalRoyal Society Open Science
Volume7
Issue number8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 1 2020

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General

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