Effect of a large gaming neighborhood and a strategy adaptation neighborhood for bolstering network reciprocity in a prisoner's dilemma game

Takashi Ogasawara, Jun Tanimoto, Eriko Fukuda, Aya Hagishima, Naoki Ikegaya

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In 22 prisoner's dilemma (PD) games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, leading to a cooperative equilibrium. In this paper, we explain how gaming neighborhoods and strategy-adaptation neighborhoods affect network reciprocity independently in spatial PD games. We explore an appropriate range of strategy adaptation neighborhoods as opposed to the conventional method of making the gaming and strategy adaptation neighborhoods coincide to enhance the level of cooperation. In cases of expanding gaming neighborhoods, network reciprocity falls to a low level relative to the conventional setting. In the discussion below, which is based on the results of our simulation, we explore how these enhancements come about. Essentially, varying the range of the neighborhoods influences how cooperative clusters form and expand in the evolutionary process.

Original languageEnglish
Article numberP12024
JournalJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
Volume2014
Issue number12
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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