Effect of a large gaming neighborhood and a strategy adaptation neighborhood for bolstering network reciprocity in a prisoner's dilemma game

Takashi Ogasawara, Jun Tanimoto, Eriko Fukuda, Aya Hagishima, Naoki Ikegaya

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In 22 prisoner's dilemma (PD) games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, leading to a cooperative equilibrium. In this paper, we explain how gaming neighborhoods and strategy-adaptation neighborhoods affect network reciprocity independently in spatial PD games. We explore an appropriate range of strategy adaptation neighborhoods as opposed to the conventional method of making the gaming and strategy adaptation neighborhoods coincide to enhance the level of cooperation. In cases of expanding gaming neighborhoods, network reciprocity falls to a low level relative to the conventional setting. In the discussion below, which is based on the results of our simulation, we explore how these enhancements come about. Essentially, varying the range of the neighborhoods influences how cooperative clusters form and expand in the evolutionary process.

Original languageEnglish
Article numberP12024
JournalJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
Volume2014
Issue number12
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2014

Fingerprint

Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Gaming
games
Reciprocity
viscosity
augmentation
Range of data
Expand
Strategy
Prisoner's dilemma game
Adaptation strategies
Viscosity
simulation
Enhancement
Simulation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this

@article{aeedd15caf5a44df8f9c867eb8fb89a5,
title = "Effect of a large gaming neighborhood and a strategy adaptation neighborhood for bolstering network reciprocity in a prisoner's dilemma game",
abstract = "In 22 prisoner's dilemma (PD) games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, leading to a cooperative equilibrium. In this paper, we explain how gaming neighborhoods and strategy-adaptation neighborhoods affect network reciprocity independently in spatial PD games. We explore an appropriate range of strategy adaptation neighborhoods as opposed to the conventional method of making the gaming and strategy adaptation neighborhoods coincide to enhance the level of cooperation. In cases of expanding gaming neighborhoods, network reciprocity falls to a low level relative to the conventional setting. In the discussion below, which is based on the results of our simulation, we explore how these enhancements come about. Essentially, varying the range of the neighborhoods influences how cooperative clusters form and expand in the evolutionary process.",
author = "Takashi Ogasawara and Jun Tanimoto and Eriko Fukuda and Aya Hagishima and Naoki Ikegaya",
year = "2014",
month = "12",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1088/1742-5468/2014/12/P12024",
language = "English",
volume = "2014",
journal = "Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment",
issn = "1742-5468",
publisher = "IOP Publishing Ltd.",
number = "12",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Effect of a large gaming neighborhood and a strategy adaptation neighborhood for bolstering network reciprocity in a prisoner's dilemma game

AU - Ogasawara, Takashi

AU - Tanimoto, Jun

AU - Fukuda, Eriko

AU - Hagishima, Aya

AU - Ikegaya, Naoki

PY - 2014/12/1

Y1 - 2014/12/1

N2 - In 22 prisoner's dilemma (PD) games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, leading to a cooperative equilibrium. In this paper, we explain how gaming neighborhoods and strategy-adaptation neighborhoods affect network reciprocity independently in spatial PD games. We explore an appropriate range of strategy adaptation neighborhoods as opposed to the conventional method of making the gaming and strategy adaptation neighborhoods coincide to enhance the level of cooperation. In cases of expanding gaming neighborhoods, network reciprocity falls to a low level relative to the conventional setting. In the discussion below, which is based on the results of our simulation, we explore how these enhancements come about. Essentially, varying the range of the neighborhoods influences how cooperative clusters form and expand in the evolutionary process.

AB - In 22 prisoner's dilemma (PD) games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, leading to a cooperative equilibrium. In this paper, we explain how gaming neighborhoods and strategy-adaptation neighborhoods affect network reciprocity independently in spatial PD games. We explore an appropriate range of strategy adaptation neighborhoods as opposed to the conventional method of making the gaming and strategy adaptation neighborhoods coincide to enhance the level of cooperation. In cases of expanding gaming neighborhoods, network reciprocity falls to a low level relative to the conventional setting. In the discussion below, which is based on the results of our simulation, we explore how these enhancements come about. Essentially, varying the range of the neighborhoods influences how cooperative clusters form and expand in the evolutionary process.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84919626601&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84919626601&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1088/1742-5468/2014/12/P12024

DO - 10.1088/1742-5468/2014/12/P12024

M3 - Article

VL - 2014

JO - Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment

JF - Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment

SN - 1742-5468

IS - 12

M1 - P12024

ER -