Effect of intermediate defense measures in voluntary vaccination games

Yoshiro Iwamura, Jun Tanimoto, Eriko Fukuda

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)


We build a model to reproduce the decision-making process of getting a vaccination based on the evolutionary game theory dovetailed with the SIR model for epidemic spreading. Unlike the two extreme options of whether or not getting a vaccination leads to perfect immunity, we consider whether 'intermediate defense measures' including masking, gargling, and hand-washing lead to imperfect effects of preventing infection. We consider introducing not only a 'third strategy' as a discrete intermediate measure but also a continuous strategy space connecting the cases of getting and not getting a vaccination. Interestingly, our evolutionary analysis suggests that the introduction of intermediate measures makes no difference for the case of a 2-strategy system in which only either getting or not getting a vaccination is allowed, even does not ameliorate, or say, gets worse to prevent spreading a disease. This seems quite different from what was observed in 2-player and 2-strategy (2 × 2) prisoner's dilemma (PD) games with relatively stronger chicken-type dilemma than the stag-hunt one in which the introduction of middle-course strategies significantly enhances cooperation.

Original languageEnglish
Article number093501
JournalJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
Issue number9
Publication statusPublished - Sep 9 2016

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


Dive into the research topics of 'Effect of intermediate defense measures in voluntary vaccination games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this