Effect of intermediate defense measures in voluntary vaccination games

Yoshiro Iwamura, Jun Tanimoto, Eriko Fukuda

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We build a model to reproduce the decision-making process of getting a vaccination based on the evolutionary game theory dovetailed with the SIR model for epidemic spreading. Unlike the two extreme options of whether or not getting a vaccination leads to perfect immunity, we consider whether 'intermediate defense measures' including masking, gargling, and hand-washing lead to imperfect effects of preventing infection. We consider introducing not only a 'third strategy' as a discrete intermediate measure but also a continuous strategy space connecting the cases of getting and not getting a vaccination. Interestingly, our evolutionary analysis suggests that the introduction of intermediate measures makes no difference for the case of a 2-strategy system in which only either getting or not getting a vaccination is allowed, even does not ameliorate, or say, gets worse to prevent spreading a disease. This seems quite different from what was observed in 2-player and 2-strategy (2 × 2) prisoner's dilemma (PD) games with relatively stronger chicken-type dilemma than the stag-hunt one in which the introduction of middle-course strategies significantly enhances cooperation.

Original languageEnglish
Article number093501
JournalJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
Volume2016
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 9 2016

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Vaccination
games
Game
game theory
Epidemic Spreading
SIR Model
Evolutionary Game Theory
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
chickens
Dilemma
washing
immunity
decision making
Masking
Immunity
infectious diseases
masking
Imperfect
Infection
Extremes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this

Effect of intermediate defense measures in voluntary vaccination games. / Iwamura, Yoshiro; Tanimoto, Jun; Fukuda, Eriko.

In: Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, Vol. 2016, No. 9, 093501, 09.09.2016.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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