取引における認証制度の有効性:─安全基準に対する信頼の観点から─

Translated title of the contribution: Effectiveness of Certification System in Transaction:From the Standpoint of the Belief of Safety Standard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper try to theoretically bring out the problems occurred when food safety signals, which are used safety standard or certification, are incompletely transmitted to buyers. Theoretical analysis of transaction game model without restriction for rational belief can explain following situations. Firstly, consumer attitude of untrustworthiness of food safety has a certain amount of rationality. Secondly, after strengthening of food sanitary inspection at upper stream of food distribution channel, the information of inspection results mislead harmful rumor. Thirdly, q excessively high or low belief of normal food spoils the effect of introducing food safety certification. Results indicate that food safety standard or certification needs proper belief control in applicable methods.
Translated title of the contributionEffectiveness of Certification System in Transaction:From the Standpoint of the Belief of Safety Standard
Original languageJapanese
Pages (from-to)83-95
Number of pages13
Journalフードシステム研究
Volume20
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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