Effects of prior investment and personal responsibility in a simple network game

Keiko Aoki, Yohsuke Ohtsubo, Amnon Rapoport, Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The present study has two purposes. First, we wish to test the descriptive power of the Nash equilibrium solution in a traffic network game with a new population of participants and a different experimental procedure. Second, we wish to determine whether the effects of prior investment and personal responsibility, that may lead people to commit to a failing project, may be generalized from individual to interactive decision tasks. For these two purposes, we implement a computer-controlled traffic network game in which the addition of a cost-free line segment to the network may, in equilibrium, increase the travel cost of all the network users.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)10-21
Number of pages12
JournalCurrent Research in Social Psychology
Volume13
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Sep 27 2007
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Psychology

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