Abstract
A password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol in the three-party setting allows two users communicating over a public network to agree on a common session key by the help of a server. In the setting the users do not share a password between themselves, but only with the server. In this paper, we explore the possibility of designing a round-efficient three-party PAKE protocol with a method to protect against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks without using the random oracle. The protocol matches the most efficient three-party PAKE protocol secure against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks among those found in the literature while providing the same level of security. Finally, we indentify the relations between detectable on-line and undetectable on-line dictionary attacks by providing counter-examples to support the observed relations1.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Computational Science - ICCS 2006 |
| Subtitle of host publication | 6th International Conference, Proceedings |
| Publisher | Springer Verlag |
| Pages | 977-980 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| ISBN (Print) | 3540343792, 9783540343790 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 1 2006 |
| Event | ICCS 2006: 6th International Conference on Computational Science - Reading, United Kingdom Duration: May 28 2006 → May 31 2006 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
|---|---|
| Volume | 3991 LNCS - I |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Other
| Other | ICCS 2006: 6th International Conference on Computational Science |
|---|---|
| Country | United Kingdom |
| City | Reading |
| Period | 5/28/06 → 5/31/06 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Science(all)
- Theoretical Computer Science
Cite this
Efficient password-authenticated key exchange for three-party secure against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks. / Kwon, Jeong Ok; Sakurai, Kouichi; Lee, Dong Hoon.
Computational Science - ICCS 2006: 6th International Conference, Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2006. p. 977-980 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3991 LNCS - I).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Efficient password-authenticated key exchange for three-party secure against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks
AU - Kwon, Jeong Ok
AU - Sakurai, Kouichi
AU - Lee, Dong Hoon
PY - 2006/1/1
Y1 - 2006/1/1
N2 - A password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol in the three-party setting allows two users communicating over a public network to agree on a common session key by the help of a server. In the setting the users do not share a password between themselves, but only with the server. In this paper, we explore the possibility of designing a round-efficient three-party PAKE protocol with a method to protect against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks without using the random oracle. The protocol matches the most efficient three-party PAKE protocol secure against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks among those found in the literature while providing the same level of security. Finally, we indentify the relations between detectable on-line and undetectable on-line dictionary attacks by providing counter-examples to support the observed relations1.
AB - A password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol in the three-party setting allows two users communicating over a public network to agree on a common session key by the help of a server. In the setting the users do not share a password between themselves, but only with the server. In this paper, we explore the possibility of designing a round-efficient three-party PAKE protocol with a method to protect against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks without using the random oracle. The protocol matches the most efficient three-party PAKE protocol secure against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks among those found in the literature while providing the same level of security. Finally, we indentify the relations between detectable on-line and undetectable on-line dictionary attacks by providing counter-examples to support the observed relations1.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33746614267&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/11758501_152
DO - 10.1007/11758501_152
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 3540343792
SN - 9783540343790
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 977
EP - 980
BT - Computational Science - ICCS 2006
PB - Springer Verlag
ER -