TY - JOUR
T1 - Empirical studies on strategic interaction among municipality governments over disaster waste after the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake
AU - Miyazaki, Takeshi
AU - Sato, Motohiro
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2017/6/1
Y1 - 2017/6/1
N2 - Strategic interaction among governments has become a major focus of empirical and theoretical work in public economics. NIMBY is one application of the literature. In the present paper, we apply the NIMBY model to the disposal of disaster debris after the Great East Japan Earthquake when there was substantial concern over radioactive contamination following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant incident. We empirically test the strategic interaction among municipality governments. We find strong evidence of such interaction. That is, in deciding whether to accept disaster waste, the municipality governments appear to keep a close eye on other municipality governments’ choices.
AB - Strategic interaction among governments has become a major focus of empirical and theoretical work in public economics. NIMBY is one application of the literature. In the present paper, we apply the NIMBY model to the disposal of disaster debris after the Great East Japan Earthquake when there was substantial concern over radioactive contamination following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant incident. We empirically test the strategic interaction among municipality governments. We find strong evidence of such interaction. That is, in deciding whether to accept disaster waste, the municipality governments appear to keep a close eye on other municipality governments’ choices.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jjie.2017.03.001
DO - 10.1016/j.jjie.2017.03.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85015444392
VL - 44
SP - 26
EP - 38
JO - Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
JF - Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
SN - 0889-1583
ER -