Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry

Zhaohong Sun, Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we study the exchange of indivisible objects where agents' possible preferences over the objects are strict and share a common structure among all of them, which represents a certain level of asymmetry among objects. A typical example of such an exchange model is a re-scheduling of tasks over several processors, since all task owners are naturally assumed to prefer that their tasks are assigned to fast processors rather than slow ones. We focus on designing exchange rules (a.k.a. mechanisms) that simultaneously satisfy strategyproofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency. We first provide a general impossibility result for agents' preferences that are determined in an additive manner, and then show an existence of such an exchange rule for further restricted lexicographic preferences. We finally find that for the restricted case, a previously known equivalence between the single-valuedness of the strict core and the existence of such an exchange rule does not carry over.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIJCAI 2015 - Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
EditorsMichael Wooldridge, Qiang Yang
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages97-103
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781577357384
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2015
Event24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015 - Buenos Aires, Argentina
Duration: Jul 25 2015Jul 31 2015

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2015-January
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Other

Other24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015
CountryArgentina
CityBuenos Aires
Period7/25/157/31/15

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Sun, Z., Hata, H., Todo, T., & Yokoo, M. (2015). Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry. In M. Wooldridge, & Q. Yang (Eds.), IJCAI 2015 - Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 97-103). (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 2015-January). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence.

Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry. / Sun, Zhaohong; Hata, Hideaki; Todo, Taiki; Yokoo, Makoto.

IJCAI 2015 - Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. ed. / Michael Wooldridge; Qiang Yang. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2015. p. 97-103 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 2015-January).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Sun, Z, Hata, H, Todo, T & Yokoo, M 2015, Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry. in M Wooldridge & Q Yang (eds), IJCAI 2015 - Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2015-January, International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 97-103, 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 7/25/15.
Sun Z, Hata H, Todo T, Yokoo M. Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry. In Wooldridge M, Yang Q, editors, IJCAI 2015 - Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. 2015. p. 97-103. (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
Sun, Zhaohong ; Hata, Hideaki ; Todo, Taiki ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry. IJCAI 2015 - Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. editor / Michael Wooldridge ; Qiang Yang. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2015. pp. 97-103 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
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