Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting

Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Cake cutting has been recognized as a fundamental model in fair division, and several envy-free cake cutting algorithms have been proposed. Recent works from the computer science field proposed novel mechanisms for cake cutting, whose approaches are based on the theory of mechanism design; these mechanisms are strategy-proof, i.e., no agent has any incentive to misrepresent her utility function, as well as envy-free. We consider a different type of manipulations; each agent might create fake identities to cheat the mechanism. Such manipulations have been called Sybils or falsename manipulations, and designing robust mechanisms against them, i.e., false-name-proof, is a challenging problem in mechanism design literature. We first show that no randomized false-name-proof cake cutting mechanism simultaneously satisfies ex-post envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. We then propose a new randomized mechanism that is optimal in terms of worst-case loss among those that satisfy false-name-proofness, ex-post envy-freeness, and a new weaker efficiency property. However, it reduces the amount of allocations for an agent exponentially with respect to the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we provide another new cake cutting mechanism that satisfies a weaker notion of false-name-proofness, as well as ex-post envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages909-917
Number of pages9
Volume2
ISBN (Electronic)9781450337700
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Event14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: May 4 2015May 8 2015

Other

Other14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period5/4/155/8/15

Fingerprint

Computer science

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Tsuruta, S., Oka, M., Todo, T., Sakurai, Y., & Yokoo, M. (2015). Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting. In AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (Vol. 2, pp. 909-917). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting. / Tsuruta, Shunsuke; Oka, Masaaki; Todo, Taiki; Sakurai, Yuko; Yokoo, Makoto.

AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Vol. 2 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2015. p. 909-917.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Tsuruta, S, Oka, M, Todo, T, Sakurai, Y & Yokoo, M 2015, Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting. in AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. vol. 2, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 909-917, 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015, Istanbul, Turkey, 5/4/15.
Tsuruta S, Oka M, Todo T, Sakurai Y, Yokoo M. Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting. In AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Vol. 2. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). 2015. p. 909-917
Tsuruta, Shunsuke ; Oka, Masaaki ; Todo, Taiki ; Sakurai, Yuko ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting. AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Vol. 2 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2015. pp. 909-917
@inproceedings{a55627ee0f6548ad94a2052e789e7fa1,
title = "Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting",
abstract = "Cake cutting has been recognized as a fundamental model in fair division, and several envy-free cake cutting algorithms have been proposed. Recent works from the computer science field proposed novel mechanisms for cake cutting, whose approaches are based on the theory of mechanism design; these mechanisms are strategy-proof, i.e., no agent has any incentive to misrepresent her utility function, as well as envy-free. We consider a different type of manipulations; each agent might create fake identities to cheat the mechanism. Such manipulations have been called Sybils or falsename manipulations, and designing robust mechanisms against them, i.e., false-name-proof, is a challenging problem in mechanism design literature. We first show that no randomized false-name-proof cake cutting mechanism simultaneously satisfies ex-post envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. We then propose a new randomized mechanism that is optimal in terms of worst-case loss among those that satisfy false-name-proofness, ex-post envy-freeness, and a new weaker efficiency property. However, it reduces the amount of allocations for an agent exponentially with respect to the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we provide another new cake cutting mechanism that satisfies a weaker notion of false-name-proofness, as well as ex-post envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency.",
author = "Shunsuke Tsuruta and Masaaki Oka and Taiki Todo and Yuko Sakurai and Makoto Yokoo",
year = "2015",
language = "English",
volume = "2",
pages = "909--917",
booktitle = "AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems",
publisher = "International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting

AU - Tsuruta, Shunsuke

AU - Oka, Masaaki

AU - Todo, Taiki

AU - Sakurai, Yuko

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Cake cutting has been recognized as a fundamental model in fair division, and several envy-free cake cutting algorithms have been proposed. Recent works from the computer science field proposed novel mechanisms for cake cutting, whose approaches are based on the theory of mechanism design; these mechanisms are strategy-proof, i.e., no agent has any incentive to misrepresent her utility function, as well as envy-free. We consider a different type of manipulations; each agent might create fake identities to cheat the mechanism. Such manipulations have been called Sybils or falsename manipulations, and designing robust mechanisms against them, i.e., false-name-proof, is a challenging problem in mechanism design literature. We first show that no randomized false-name-proof cake cutting mechanism simultaneously satisfies ex-post envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. We then propose a new randomized mechanism that is optimal in terms of worst-case loss among those that satisfy false-name-proofness, ex-post envy-freeness, and a new weaker efficiency property. However, it reduces the amount of allocations for an agent exponentially with respect to the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we provide another new cake cutting mechanism that satisfies a weaker notion of false-name-proofness, as well as ex-post envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency.

AB - Cake cutting has been recognized as a fundamental model in fair division, and several envy-free cake cutting algorithms have been proposed. Recent works from the computer science field proposed novel mechanisms for cake cutting, whose approaches are based on the theory of mechanism design; these mechanisms are strategy-proof, i.e., no agent has any incentive to misrepresent her utility function, as well as envy-free. We consider a different type of manipulations; each agent might create fake identities to cheat the mechanism. Such manipulations have been called Sybils or falsename manipulations, and designing robust mechanisms against them, i.e., false-name-proof, is a challenging problem in mechanism design literature. We first show that no randomized false-name-proof cake cutting mechanism simultaneously satisfies ex-post envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. We then propose a new randomized mechanism that is optimal in terms of worst-case loss among those that satisfy false-name-proofness, ex-post envy-freeness, and a new weaker efficiency property. However, it reduces the amount of allocations for an agent exponentially with respect to the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we provide another new cake cutting mechanism that satisfies a weaker notion of false-name-proofness, as well as ex-post envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84945184093&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84945184093&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84945184093

VL - 2

SP - 909

EP - 917

BT - AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)

ER -