False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves mechanism with submodular approximation

Makoto Yokoo, Toshihiro Matsutani, Atsushi Iwasaki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

13 Citations (Scopus)


This paper develops a, new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics: (1) it is false-name-proof, (2) each winner is included in a Pareto efficient allocation, and (3) as long as a Pareto efficient allocation is achieved, the protocol is robust against the collusion of losers and the outcome is in the core. As far as the authors are aware, the GM-SMA is the first protocol that satisfies all three of these characteristics. The basic ideas of the GM-SMA are as follows: (i) It is based on the VCG protocol, i.e., the payment of a winner in this protocol is identical to the payment in one instance of the Groves mechanism, which is a class of protocols that includes the VCG. (ii) When calculating the payment of a, bidder, we approximate the valuations of other bidders by using a submodular valuation function (submodular approximation). Simulation results show that the GM-SMA achieves a better social surplus and seller's revenue than existing false-name-proof protocols, as long as the submodular approximation is close enough to the original valuations.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Number of pages8
Publication statusPublished - 2006
EventFifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS - Hakodate, Japan
Duration: May 8 2006May 12 2006

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents


OtherFifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Engineering(all)

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