TY - GEN

T1 - False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Wheel Graphs

AU - Osoegawa, Koji

AU - Todo, Taiki

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements. This work is partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP20H00587, JP20H00609, and JP21H04979.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - In this paper, we consider the study of two classes of mechanism design problems for locating a facility on a wheel graph with k≥ 4 vertices, where a vertex is located at the center, which is surrounded by a cycle graph with k- 1 vertices and connected to each vertex in the cycle. Two domains of agents’ preferences are considered; the single-peaked domain and the single-dipped domain. We are interested in the existence of anonymous social choice functions that are false-name-proof and Pareto efficient. For both domains of preferences, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition on the graph parameter k to guarantee the existence of such social choice functions. Namely, for the single-peaked preference domain, such social choice functions exist if and only if k≤ 5. On the other hand, for the single-dipped preference domain, such social choice functions exist if and only if k≤ 7.

AB - In this paper, we consider the study of two classes of mechanism design problems for locating a facility on a wheel graph with k≥ 4 vertices, where a vertex is located at the center, which is surrounded by a cycle graph with k- 1 vertices and connected to each vertex in the cycle. Two domains of agents’ preferences are considered; the single-peaked domain and the single-dipped domain. We are interested in the existence of anonymous social choice functions that are false-name-proof and Pareto efficient. For both domains of preferences, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition on the graph parameter k to guarantee the existence of such social choice functions. Namely, for the single-peaked preference domain, such social choice functions exist if and only if k≤ 5. On the other hand, for the single-dipped preference domain, such social choice functions exist if and only if k≤ 7.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85142754580&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85142754580&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-21203-1_9

DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-21203-1_9

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85142754580

SN - 9783031212024

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 139

EP - 155

BT - PRIMA 2022

A2 - Aydoğan, Reyhan

A2 - Criado, Natalia

A2 - Sanchez-Anguix, Victor

A2 - Lang, Jérôme

A2 - Serramia, Marc

PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH

T2 - 24th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2020

Y2 - 16 November 2022 through 18 November 2022

ER -