TY - GEN
T1 - False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Wheel Graphs
AU - Osoegawa, Koji
AU - Todo, Taiki
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements. This work is partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP20H00587, JP20H00609, and JP21H04979.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - In this paper, we consider the study of two classes of mechanism design problems for locating a facility on a wheel graph with k≥ 4 vertices, where a vertex is located at the center, which is surrounded by a cycle graph with k- 1 vertices and connected to each vertex in the cycle. Two domains of agents’ preferences are considered; the single-peaked domain and the single-dipped domain. We are interested in the existence of anonymous social choice functions that are false-name-proof and Pareto efficient. For both domains of preferences, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition on the graph parameter k to guarantee the existence of such social choice functions. Namely, for the single-peaked preference domain, such social choice functions exist if and only if k≤ 5. On the other hand, for the single-dipped preference domain, such social choice functions exist if and only if k≤ 7.
AB - In this paper, we consider the study of two classes of mechanism design problems for locating a facility on a wheel graph with k≥ 4 vertices, where a vertex is located at the center, which is surrounded by a cycle graph with k- 1 vertices and connected to each vertex in the cycle. Two domains of agents’ preferences are considered; the single-peaked domain and the single-dipped domain. We are interested in the existence of anonymous social choice functions that are false-name-proof and Pareto efficient. For both domains of preferences, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition on the graph parameter k to guarantee the existence of such social choice functions. Namely, for the single-peaked preference domain, such social choice functions exist if and only if k≤ 5. On the other hand, for the single-dipped preference domain, such social choice functions exist if and only if k≤ 7.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-21203-1_9
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-21203-1_9
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85142754580
SN - 9783031212024
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 139
EP - 155
BT - PRIMA 2022
A2 - Aydoğan, Reyhan
A2 - Criado, Natalia
A2 - Sanchez-Anguix, Victor
A2 - Lang, Jérôme
A2 - Serramia, Marc
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 24th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2020
Y2 - 16 November 2022 through 18 November 2022
ER -