False-name-proof locations of two facilities: Economic and algorithmic approaches

Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers a mechanism design problem for locating two identical facilities on an interval, in which an agent can pretend to be multiple agents. A mechanism selects a pair of locations on the interval according to the declared singlepeaked preferences of agents. An agent's utility is determined by the location of the better one (typically the closer to her ideal point). This model can represent various application domains. For example, assume a company is going to release two models of its product line and performs a questionnaire survey in an online forum to determine their detailed specs. Typically, a customer will buy only one model, but she can answer multiple times by logging onto the forum under several email accounts. We first characterize possible outcomes of mechanisms that satisfy false-name-proofness, as well as some mild conditions. By extending the result, we completely characterize the class of false-name-proof mechanisms when locating two facilities on a circle.We then clarify the approximation ratios of the false-name-proof mechanisms on a line metric for the social and maximum costs. 1 Introduction.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
PublisherAAAI Press
Pages615-621
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781577357605
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2016
Event30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016 - Phoenix, United States
Duration: Feb 12 2016Feb 17 2016

Publication series

Name30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016

Other

Other30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
CountryUnited States
CityPhoenix
Period2/12/162/17/16

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Economics
Electronic mail
Costs
Industry

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Sonoda, A., Todo, T., & Yokoo, M. (2016). False-name-proof locations of two facilities: Economic and algorithmic approaches. In 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016 (pp. 615-621). (30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016). AAAI Press.

False-name-proof locations of two facilities : Economic and algorithmic approaches. / Sonoda, Akihisa; Todo, Taiki; Yokoo, Makoto.

30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016. AAAI Press, 2016. p. 615-621 (30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Sonoda, A, Todo, T & Yokoo, M 2016, False-name-proof locations of two facilities: Economic and algorithmic approaches. in 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016. 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016, AAAI Press, pp. 615-621, 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016, Phoenix, United States, 2/12/16.
Sonoda A, Todo T, Yokoo M. False-name-proof locations of two facilities: Economic and algorithmic approaches. In 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016. AAAI Press. 2016. p. 615-621. (30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016).
Sonoda, Akihisa ; Todo, Taiki ; Yokoo, Makoto. / False-name-proof locations of two facilities : Economic and algorithmic approaches. 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016. AAAI Press, 2016. pp. 615-621 (30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016).
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