False-name-proof Mechanisms for hiring a team

Yasumasa Saito, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, David Kempe, Mahyar Salek

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper develops two new false-name-proof auction mechanisms for hiring a team. In the problem of hiring a team, each agent is assumed to own one or more edges of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purchase a feasible solution to perform a task by conducting an auction. We introduce two models of false-name manipulations in hiring a team auctions and propose the MP and AP mechanisms, that are robust against false-name manipulations. Furthermore, we show the frugality ratio of MP is bounded by n2", and that of AP is bounded by reserve cost, which is choosen a priori by the auctioneer.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)199-207
Number of pages9
JournalComputer Software
Volume25
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2008

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software

Cite this

Saito, Y., Iwasaki, A., Yokoo, M., Kempe, D., & Salek, M. (2008). False-name-proof Mechanisms for hiring a team. Computer Software, 25(4), 199-207.

False-name-proof Mechanisms for hiring a team. / Saito, Yasumasa; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto; Kempe, David; Salek, Mahyar.

In: Computer Software, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2008, p. 199-207.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Saito, Y, Iwasaki, A, Yokoo, M, Kempe, D & Salek, M 2008, 'False-name-proof Mechanisms for hiring a team', Computer Software, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 199-207.
Saito Y, Iwasaki A, Yokoo M, Kempe D, Salek M. False-name-proof Mechanisms for hiring a team. Computer Software. 2008;25(4):199-207.
Saito, Yasumasa ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Yokoo, Makoto ; Kempe, David ; Salek, Mahyar. / False-name-proof Mechanisms for hiring a team. In: Computer Software. 2008 ; Vol. 25, No. 4. pp. 199-207.
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