False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team

Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahyar Salek, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purchase a feasible solution by conducting an auction. Our goal is to design auctions that are truthful and false-name-proof, meaning that it is in the agents' best interest to reveal ownership of all elements (which may not be known to the auctioneer a priori) as well as their true incurred costs.We first propose and analyze a false-name-proof mechanism for the special cases where each agent owns only one element in reality. We prove that its frugality ratio is bounded by n2n, which nearly matches a lower bound of Ω(2n) for all false-name-proof mechanisms in this scenario. We then propose a second mechanism. It requires the auctioneer to choose a reserve cost a priori, and thus does not always purchase a solution. In return, it is false-name-proof even when agents own multiple elements. We experimentally evaluate the payment (as well as social surplus) of the second mechanism through simulation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, Proceedings
Pages245-256
Number of pages12
Volume4858 LNCS
Publication statusPublished - 2007
Event3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2007 - San Diego, CA, United States
Duration: Dec 12 2007Dec 14 2007

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4858 LNCS
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

Other3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2007
CountryUnited States
CitySan Diego, CA
Period12/12/0712/14/07

Fingerprint

Names
Chemical elements
Auctions
Costs and Cost Analysis
Ownership
Set Systems
Costs
Choose
False
Lower bound
Scenarios
Evaluate
Simulation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

Iwasaki, A., Kempe, D., Saito, Y., Salek, M., & Yokoo, M. (2007). False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team. In Internet and Network Economics - Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, Proceedings (Vol. 4858 LNCS, pp. 245-256). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4858 LNCS).

False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team. / Iwasaki, Atsushi; Kempe, David; Saito, Yasumasa; Salek, Mahyar; Yokoo, Makoto.

Internet and Network Economics - Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, Proceedings. Vol. 4858 LNCS 2007. p. 245-256 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4858 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Iwasaki, A, Kempe, D, Saito, Y, Salek, M & Yokoo, M 2007, False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team. in Internet and Network Economics - Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, Proceedings. vol. 4858 LNCS, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 4858 LNCS, pp. 245-256, 3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, United States, 12/12/07.
Iwasaki A, Kempe D, Saito Y, Salek M, Yokoo M. False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team. In Internet and Network Economics - Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, Proceedings. Vol. 4858 LNCS. 2007. p. 245-256. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Kempe, David ; Saito, Yasumasa ; Salek, Mahyar ; Yokoo, Makoto. / False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team. Internet and Network Economics - Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, Proceedings. Vol. 4858 LNCS 2007. pp. 245-256 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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