False-name-proof multi-unit auction protocol utilizing greedy allocation based on approximate evaluation values

Kenji Terada, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

This paper presents a new false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocol called Greedy ALlocation (GAL) protocol. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for executing auctions, the possibility of a new type of cheating called false-name bids has been pointed out. A false-name bid is a bid submitted under a fictitious name. A protocol called Iterative Reducing (IR) protocol has been developed for multi-unit auctions and has proven to be false-name-proof, i.e., using false-name bids is useless. For Internet auction protocols, being false-name-proof is important since identifying each participant on the Internet is virtually impossible. One shortcoming of the IR protocol is that it requires the auctioneer to carefully pre-determine the reservation price for one unit. Our newly developed GAL protocol is easier to use than the IR, since the auctioneer does not need to set the reservation price nor any other parameters. The evaluation results show that the GAL protocol can obtain a social surplus that is very close to Pareto efficient. Furthermore, the obtained social surplus and seller’s revenue are much better than those of the IR protocol even if the reservation price is set optimally.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIntelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems - 5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2002, Proceedings
EditorsJaeho Lee, Kazuhiro Kuwabara
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages48-62
Number of pages15
ISBN (Print)3540440267, 9783540456803
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2002
Event5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2002 - Tokyo, Japan
Duration: Aug 18 2002Aug 19 2002

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2413
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2002
CountryJapan
CityTokyo
Period8/18/028/19/02

Fingerprint

Auctions
Network protocols
Unit
Evaluation
Reservation
Internet
False
Internet protocols
Electronic commerce
Electronic Commerce
Artificial intelligence
Pareto
Artificial Intelligence
Infrastructure

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Terada, K., & Yokoo, M. (2002). False-name-proof multi-unit auction protocol utilizing greedy allocation based on approximate evaluation values. In J. Lee, & K. Kuwabara (Eds.), Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems - 5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2002, Proceedings (pp. 48-62). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2413). Springer Verlag.

False-name-proof multi-unit auction protocol utilizing greedy allocation based on approximate evaluation values. / Terada, Kenji; Yokoo, Makoto.

Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems - 5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2002, Proceedings. ed. / Jaeho Lee; Kazuhiro Kuwabara. Springer Verlag, 2002. p. 48-62 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2413).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Terada, K & Yokoo, M 2002, False-name-proof multi-unit auction protocol utilizing greedy allocation based on approximate evaluation values. in J Lee & K Kuwabara (eds), Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems - 5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2002, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 2413, Springer Verlag, pp. 48-62, 5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2002, Tokyo, Japan, 8/18/02.
Terada K, Yokoo M. False-name-proof multi-unit auction protocol utilizing greedy allocation based on approximate evaluation values. In Lee J, Kuwabara K, editors, Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems - 5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2002, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2002. p. 48-62. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
Terada, Kenji ; Yokoo, Makoto. / False-name-proof multi-unit auction protocol utilizing greedy allocation based on approximate evaluation values. Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems - 5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 2002, Proceedings. editor / Jaeho Lee ; Kazuhiro Kuwabara. Springer Verlag, 2002. pp. 48-62 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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