Further investigations of framing effects on cooperative choices in a provision point mechanism

Koji Kotani, Shunsuke Managi, Kenta Tanaka

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate whether framing effects of voluntary contributions are significant in a provision point mechanism. Our results show that framing significantly affects individuals of the same type: cooperative individuals appear to be more cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game, whereas individualistic subjects appear to be less cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game. At the aggregate level of pooling all individuals, the data suggests that framing effects are negligible, which is in contrast with the established result.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume3
Issue number51
Publication statusPublished - Aug 31 2008
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Framing effects
Provision point
Pooling
Voluntary contributions

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Further investigations of framing effects on cooperative choices in a provision point mechanism. / Kotani, Koji; Managi, Shunsuke; Tanaka, Kenta.

In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 51, 31.08.2008.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{7f1b5282f1ce49798f6cfc185a852fe5,
title = "Further investigations of framing effects on cooperative choices in a provision point mechanism",
abstract = "We investigate whether framing effects of voluntary contributions are significant in a provision point mechanism. Our results show that framing significantly affects individuals of the same type: cooperative individuals appear to be more cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game, whereas individualistic subjects appear to be less cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game. At the aggregate level of pooling all individuals, the data suggests that framing effects are negligible, which is in contrast with the established result.",
author = "Koji Kotani and Shunsuke Managi and Kenta Tanaka",
year = "2008",
month = "8",
day = "31",
language = "English",
volume = "3",
journal = "Economics Bulletin",
issn = "1545-2921",
publisher = "Economics Bulletin",
number = "51",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Further investigations of framing effects on cooperative choices in a provision point mechanism

AU - Kotani, Koji

AU - Managi, Shunsuke

AU - Tanaka, Kenta

PY - 2008/8/31

Y1 - 2008/8/31

N2 - We investigate whether framing effects of voluntary contributions are significant in a provision point mechanism. Our results show that framing significantly affects individuals of the same type: cooperative individuals appear to be more cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game, whereas individualistic subjects appear to be less cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game. At the aggregate level of pooling all individuals, the data suggests that framing effects are negligible, which is in contrast with the established result.

AB - We investigate whether framing effects of voluntary contributions are significant in a provision point mechanism. Our results show that framing significantly affects individuals of the same type: cooperative individuals appear to be more cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game, whereas individualistic subjects appear to be less cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game. At the aggregate level of pooling all individuals, the data suggests that framing effects are negligible, which is in contrast with the established result.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=55449130459&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=55449130459&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:55449130459

VL - 3

JO - Economics Bulletin

JF - Economics Bulletin

SN - 1545-2921

IS - 51

ER -