Abstract
This tutorial focuses on designing a mechanism that achieves a socially desirable outcome or a goal of the designer that arises from some practical demands, as several advanced topics on mechanism design theory. We first briefly explains the theory of combinatorial auctions via the most well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Second, as an example that designs a new mechanism for a practical demand, we introduce false-name bids and illustrate how we improve a trivial robust mechanism against false-name bids. Furthermore, we explore models and several theoretical results on mechanisms of a keyword auction and a two-sided matching as other well-known topics of mechanism design theory.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 34-52 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Computer Software |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2013 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Software
Cite this
Game theory for computer scientist-mechanism design (advanced). / Yokoo, Makoto; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Sakurai, Yuko; Okamoto, Yoshio.
In: Computer Software, Vol. 30, No. 1, 02.2013, p. 34-52.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Game theory for computer scientist-mechanism design (advanced)
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
AU - Iwasaki, Atsushi
AU - Sakurai, Yuko
AU - Okamoto, Yoshio
PY - 2013/2
Y1 - 2013/2
N2 - This tutorial focuses on designing a mechanism that achieves a socially desirable outcome or a goal of the designer that arises from some practical demands, as several advanced topics on mechanism design theory. We first briefly explains the theory of combinatorial auctions via the most well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Second, as an example that designs a new mechanism for a practical demand, we introduce false-name bids and illustrate how we improve a trivial robust mechanism against false-name bids. Furthermore, we explore models and several theoretical results on mechanisms of a keyword auction and a two-sided matching as other well-known topics of mechanism design theory.
AB - This tutorial focuses on designing a mechanism that achieves a socially desirable outcome or a goal of the designer that arises from some practical demands, as several advanced topics on mechanism design theory. We first briefly explains the theory of combinatorial auctions via the most well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Second, as an example that designs a new mechanism for a practical demand, we introduce false-name bids and illustrate how we improve a trivial robust mechanism against false-name bids. Furthermore, we explore models and several theoretical results on mechanisms of a keyword auction and a two-sided matching as other well-known topics of mechanism design theory.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84878124912&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84878124912
VL - 30
SP - 34
EP - 52
JO - Computer Software
JF - Computer Software
SN - 0289-6540
IS - 1
ER -