Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources

Jounghun Lee, Marko Jusup, Yoh Iwasa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Maintaining human cooperation in the context of common-pool resource management is extremely important because otherwise we risk overuse and corruption. To analyse the interplay between economic and ecological factors leading to corruption, we couple the resource dynamics and the evolutionary dynamics of strategic decision making into a powerful analytical framework. The traits of this framework are: (i) an arbitrary number of harvesters share the responsibility to sustainably exploit a specific part of an ecosystem, (ii) harvesters face three strategic choices for exploiting the resource, (iii) a delegated enforcement system is available if called upon, (iv) enforcers are either honest or corrupt, and (v) the resource abundance reflects the choice of harvesting strategies. The resulting dynamical system is bistable; depending on the initial conditions, it evolves either to cooperative (sustainable exploitation) or defecting (overexploitation) equilibria. Using the domain of attraction to cooperative equilibria as an indicator of successful management, we find that the more resilient the resource (as implied by a high growth rate), the more likely the dominance of corruption which, in turn, suppresses the cooperative outcome. A qualitatively similar result arises when slow resource dynamics relative to the dynamics of decision making mask the benefit of cooperation. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of managing common-pool resources.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)76-86
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Theoretical Biology
Volume428
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 7 2017

Fingerprint

Decision Making
Game
cooperatives
Resources
Harvesters
harvesters
Masks
Ecosystem
decision making
Decision making
Economics
resource management
Growth
Ecosystems
Dynamical systems
Evolutionary Dynamics
Domain of Attraction
Harvesting
Resource Management
economics

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Immunology and Microbiology(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources. / Lee, Jounghun; Jusup, Marko; Iwasa, Yoh.

In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 428, 07.09.2017, p. 76-86.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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