General fault attacks on multivariate public key cryptosystems

Yasufumi Hashimoto, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Kouichi Sakurai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The multivariate public key cryptosystem (MPKC), which is based on the problem of solving a set of multivariate systems of quadratic equations over a finite field, is expected to be secure against quantum attacks. Although there are several existing schemes in MPKC that survived known attacks and are much faster than RSA and ECC, there have been few discussions on security against physical attacks, aside from the work of Okeya et al. (2005) on side-channel attacks against Sflash. In this study, we describe general fault attacks on MPKCs including Big Field type (e.g. Matsumoto-Imai, HFE and Sflash) and Stepwise Triangular System (STS) type (e.g. UOV, Rainbow and TTM/TTS). For both types, recovering (parts of) the secret keys S, T with our fault attacks becomes more efficient than doing without them. Especially, on the Big Field type, only single fault is sufficient to recover the secret keys.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)196-205
Number of pages10
JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
VolumeE96-A
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2013

Fingerprint

Fault Attacks
Public-key Cryptosystem
Cryptography
Attack
Triangular Systems
Side Channel Attacks
Quadratic equation
Galois field
Fault
Sufficient
Side channel attack

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

General fault attacks on multivariate public key cryptosystems. / Hashimoto, Yasufumi; Takagi, Tsuyoshi; Sakurai, Kouichi.

In: IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, Vol. E96-A, No. 1, 01.01.2013, p. 196-205.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{5bc7cf6cf24f43219cbd8566ad9092d7,
title = "General fault attacks on multivariate public key cryptosystems",
abstract = "The multivariate public key cryptosystem (MPKC), which is based on the problem of solving a set of multivariate systems of quadratic equations over a finite field, is expected to be secure against quantum attacks. Although there are several existing schemes in MPKC that survived known attacks and are much faster than RSA and ECC, there have been few discussions on security against physical attacks, aside from the work of Okeya et al. (2005) on side-channel attacks against Sflash. In this study, we describe general fault attacks on MPKCs including Big Field type (e.g. Matsumoto-Imai, HFE and Sflash) and Stepwise Triangular System (STS) type (e.g. UOV, Rainbow and TTM/TTS). For both types, recovering (parts of) the secret keys S, T with our fault attacks becomes more efficient than doing without them. Especially, on the Big Field type, only single fault is sufficient to recover the secret keys.",
author = "Yasufumi Hashimoto and Tsuyoshi Takagi and Kouichi Sakurai",
year = "2013",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1587/transfun.E96.A.196",
language = "English",
volume = "E96-A",
pages = "196--205",
journal = "IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences",
issn = "0916-8508",
publisher = "Maruzen Co., Ltd/Maruzen Kabushikikaisha",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - General fault attacks on multivariate public key cryptosystems

AU - Hashimoto, Yasufumi

AU - Takagi, Tsuyoshi

AU - Sakurai, Kouichi

PY - 2013/1/1

Y1 - 2013/1/1

N2 - The multivariate public key cryptosystem (MPKC), which is based on the problem of solving a set of multivariate systems of quadratic equations over a finite field, is expected to be secure against quantum attacks. Although there are several existing schemes in MPKC that survived known attacks and are much faster than RSA and ECC, there have been few discussions on security against physical attacks, aside from the work of Okeya et al. (2005) on side-channel attacks against Sflash. In this study, we describe general fault attacks on MPKCs including Big Field type (e.g. Matsumoto-Imai, HFE and Sflash) and Stepwise Triangular System (STS) type (e.g. UOV, Rainbow and TTM/TTS). For both types, recovering (parts of) the secret keys S, T with our fault attacks becomes more efficient than doing without them. Especially, on the Big Field type, only single fault is sufficient to recover the secret keys.

AB - The multivariate public key cryptosystem (MPKC), which is based on the problem of solving a set of multivariate systems of quadratic equations over a finite field, is expected to be secure against quantum attacks. Although there are several existing schemes in MPKC that survived known attacks and are much faster than RSA and ECC, there have been few discussions on security against physical attacks, aside from the work of Okeya et al. (2005) on side-channel attacks against Sflash. In this study, we describe general fault attacks on MPKCs including Big Field type (e.g. Matsumoto-Imai, HFE and Sflash) and Stepwise Triangular System (STS) type (e.g. UOV, Rainbow and TTM/TTS). For both types, recovering (parts of) the secret keys S, T with our fault attacks becomes more efficient than doing without them. Especially, on the Big Field type, only single fault is sufficient to recover the secret keys.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84871869889&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84871869889&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.196

DO - 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.196

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84871869889

VL - E96-A

SP - 196

EP - 205

JO - IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences

JF - IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences

SN - 0916-8508

IS - 1

ER -