General fault attacks on multivariate public key cryptosystems

Yasufumi Hashimoto, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Kouichi Sakurai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The multivariate public key cryptosystem (MPKC), which is based on the problem of solving a set of multivariate systems of quadratic equations over a finite field, is expected to be secure against quantum attacks. Although there are several existing schemes in MPKC that survived known attacks and are much faster than RSA and ECC, there have been few discussions on security against physical attacks, aside from the work of Okeya et al. (2005) on side-channel attacks against Sflash. In this study, we describe general fault attacks on MPKCs including Big Field type (e.g. Matsumoto-Imai, HFE and Sflash) and Stepwise Triangular System (STS) type (e.g. UOV, Rainbow and TTM/TTS). For both types, recovering (parts of) the secret keys S, T with our fault attacks becomes more efficient than doing without them. Especially, on the Big Field type, only single fault is sufficient to recover the secret keys.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)196-205
Number of pages10
JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
VolumeE96-A
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'General fault attacks on multivariate public key cryptosystems'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this