Generalized vickrey auction and suppression of active adversary using incentive-compatible implementation

Makoto Yokoo, Koutarou Suzuki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper presents an attempt to make rational active adversary passive using mechanism design. We propose a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme where the procedure executed by a bidder affects neither the prices nor the allocation of the bidder. Therefore, a bidder does not have an incentive to be an active adversary.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)255-261
Number of pages7
JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
VolumeE88-A
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2005

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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