Generalizing envy-freeness toward group of agents

Taiki Todo, Runcong Li, Xuemei Hu, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Envy-freeness is a well-known fairness concept for analyzing mechanisms. Its traditional definition requires that no individual envies another individual. However, an individual (or a group of agents) may envy another group, even if she (or they) does not envy another individual. In mechanisms with monetary transfer, such as combinatorial auctions, considering such fairness requirements, which are refinements of traditional envy-freeness, is meaningful and brings up a new interesting research direction in mechanism design. In this paper, we introduce two new concepts of fairness called envy-freeness of an individual toward a group, and envy-freeness of a group toward a group . They are natural extensions of traditional envy-freeness. We discuss combinatorial auction mechanisms that satisfy these concepts. First, we characterize such mechanisms by focusing on their allocation rules. Then we clarify the connections between these concepts and three other properties: the core, strategy-proofness, and false-name-proofness.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIJCAI 2011 - 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Pages386-392
Number of pages7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Event22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2011 - Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain
Duration: Jul 16 2011Jul 22 2011

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Other

Other22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2011
CountrySpain
CityBarcelona, Catalonia
Period7/16/117/22/11

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

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