How does resolution of strategy affect network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the canonical framework of evolutionary 2 × 2 games, a binary strategy set comprising cooperation (C) and defection (D) has usually been presumed. Inspired by commonly observed real-world facts, we explore what happens if the resolution of strategy increases. As an extreme limit, the infinite resolution case is both a continuous and a mixed strategy defined by a real number in the range of [0,1]. We find that increasing resolution amplifies cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games as compared with the binary strategy definition; however, this enhancement tendency with increasing resolution is not monotonic in the case of a mixed-strategy setting.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)36-42
Number of pages7
JournalApplied Mathematics and Computation
Volume301
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 15 2017

Fingerprint

Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Reciprocity
Mixed Strategy
Binary
Evolutionary Game
Monotonic
Extremes
Enhancement
Strategy
Range of data

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computational Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

@article{3532ad2802584103bd517b01e24f4234,
title = "How does resolution of strategy affect network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games?",
abstract = "In the canonical framework of evolutionary 2 × 2 games, a binary strategy set comprising cooperation (C) and defection (D) has usually been presumed. Inspired by commonly observed real-world facts, we explore what happens if the resolution of strategy increases. As an extreme limit, the infinite resolution case is both a continuous and a mixed strategy defined by a real number in the range of [0,1]. We find that increasing resolution amplifies cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games as compared with the binary strategy definition; however, this enhancement tendency with increasing resolution is not monotonic in the case of a mixed-strategy setting.",
author = "Jun Tanimoto",
year = "2017",
month = "5",
day = "15",
doi = "10.1016/j.amc.2016.11.036",
language = "English",
volume = "301",
pages = "36--42",
journal = "Applied Mathematics and Computation",
issn = "0096-3003",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - How does resolution of strategy affect network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games?

AU - Tanimoto, Jun

PY - 2017/5/15

Y1 - 2017/5/15

N2 - In the canonical framework of evolutionary 2 × 2 games, a binary strategy set comprising cooperation (C) and defection (D) has usually been presumed. Inspired by commonly observed real-world facts, we explore what happens if the resolution of strategy increases. As an extreme limit, the infinite resolution case is both a continuous and a mixed strategy defined by a real number in the range of [0,1]. We find that increasing resolution amplifies cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games as compared with the binary strategy definition; however, this enhancement tendency with increasing resolution is not monotonic in the case of a mixed-strategy setting.

AB - In the canonical framework of evolutionary 2 × 2 games, a binary strategy set comprising cooperation (C) and defection (D) has usually been presumed. Inspired by commonly observed real-world facts, we explore what happens if the resolution of strategy increases. As an extreme limit, the infinite resolution case is both a continuous and a mixed strategy defined by a real number in the range of [0,1]. We find that increasing resolution amplifies cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games as compared with the binary strategy definition; however, this enhancement tendency with increasing resolution is not monotonic in the case of a mixed-strategy setting.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85007170306&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85007170306&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.amc.2016.11.036

DO - 10.1016/j.amc.2016.11.036

M3 - Article

VL - 301

SP - 36

EP - 42

JO - Applied Mathematics and Computation

JF - Applied Mathematics and Computation

SN - 0096-3003

ER -