Implementing a strategyproof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction and extending to ascending auction

Takayuki Ito, Makoto Yokoo, Shigeo Matsubara, Atsushi Iwasaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper proposes a new combinatorial auction protocol called Average-Max-Minimal-Bundle (AM-MB) protocol. The characteristics of the AM-MB protocol are as follows: (i) it is strategyproof, that is, truth-telling is a dominant strategy, (ii) the computational overhead is very low, since it allocates bundles greedily thereby avoiding an explicit combinatorial optimization problem, and (iii) it can obtain higher social surplus and revenue than can the Max-Minimal-Bundle (M-MB) protocol, which also satisfies (i) and (ii). Furthermore, this paper extends the AM-MB protocol to an open ascending-price protocol in which straight-forward bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)44-51
Number of pages8
JournalSystems and Computers in Japan
Volume38
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 1 2007

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Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial optimization
Auctions
Bundle
Bidding
Combinatorial Optimization Problem
Nash Equilibrium
Straight

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Information Systems
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics

Cite this

Implementing a strategyproof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction and extending to ascending auction. / Ito, Takayuki; Yokoo, Makoto; Matsubara, Shigeo; Iwasaki, Atsushi.

In: Systems and Computers in Japan, Vol. 38, No. 9, 01.08.2007, p. 44-51.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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