Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism

Sung Ho Cho, Miyuki Koshimura, Pinaki Mandal, Kentaro Yahiro, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. When the set of feasible matchings is restricted by some distributional constraints, a stable matching may not exist. In contrast, a weakly stable matching is guaranteed to exist under a very general class of constraints that satisfies a condition called heredity. However, it has been an open question whether a weakly stable matching can be obtained by a strategy-proof mechanism. We negatively answer this open question; no weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists under any heredity feasibility constraint in general.

Original languageEnglish
Article number110675
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume217
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2022

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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