Incentives in ridesharing with deficit control

Dengji Zhao, Dongmo Zhang, Enrico H. Gerding, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper proposes a novel market-based system for ridesharing, where commuters are matched based on their declared travel constraints, the number of available seats (which could be zero), and their costs. Based on this information, the system then designates commuters to be either drivers or riders, finds appropriate matches, and calculates rewards for drivers and payments for riders. We show that, for this system, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is incentive compatible (IC), individually rational (IR) and efficient (i.e., minimizing cost), but results in a very high deficit, thus requiring large subsidies. We therefore investigate alternative mechanisms. We first consider mechanisms with fixed prices and show that no such mechanism can be both efficient and IC. Thus, we propose an inefficient IC mechanism but which has deficit control. We then consider a VCG mechanism with two-sided reserve prices. We show that this mechanism is IC and IR for a certain range of reserve prices, and we analyse the deficit bounds and how these can be controlled. We furthermore show that the deficit can be controlled even further by limiting the (costly) detours taken by the drivers when computing the allocations, thereby trading off efficiency and deficit.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1021-1028
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781634391313
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2014
Event13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014 - Paris, France
Duration: May 5 2014May 9 2014

Publication series

Name13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014
Volume2

Other

Other13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period5/5/145/9/14

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Zhao, D., Zhang, D., Gerding, E. H., Sakurai, Y., & Yokoo, M. (2014). Incentives in ridesharing with deficit control. In 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014 (pp. 1021-1028). (13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014; Vol. 2). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

Incentives in ridesharing with deficit control. / Zhao, Dengji; Zhang, Dongmo; Gerding, Enrico H.; Sakurai, Yuko; Yokoo, Makoto.

13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2014. p. 1021-1028 (13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014; Vol. 2).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Zhao, D, Zhang, D, Gerding, EH, Sakurai, Y & Yokoo, M 2014, Incentives in ridesharing with deficit control. in 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014. 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014, vol. 2, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 1021-1028, 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014, Paris, France, 5/5/14.
Zhao D, Zhang D, Gerding EH, Sakurai Y, Yokoo M. Incentives in ridesharing with deficit control. In 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). 2014. p. 1021-1028. (13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014).
Zhao, Dengji ; Zhang, Dongmo ; Gerding, Enrico H. ; Sakurai, Yuko ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Incentives in ridesharing with deficit control. 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2014. pp. 1021-1028 (13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014).
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