Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets

Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider a social choice problem where individual rationality is required. The status quo belongs to the outcome space, and the selected alternative must be weakly better than the status quo for everybody. If the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the alternatives, we obtain a negative result: any individually rational (IR) and strategy-proof (SP) mechanism can choose at most one alternative (besides the status quo), regardless of the preferences. To overcome this negative result, we consider a domain where the alternatives have a known structure, i.e., an agent is indifferent between the status quo and a subset of the outcomes. This set is exogenously given and public information. This assumption is natural if the social choice involves the participation of agents. For example, consider a group of people organizing a trip where participation is voluntary. We can assume each agent is indifferent between the trip plans in which she does not participate and the status quo (i.e., no trip). In this setting, we obtain more positive results: we develop a class of mechanisms called Approve and Choose mechanisms, which are IR and SP, and can choose multiple alternatives as well as the status quo.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPrinciles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 19th International Conference, PRIMA 2016, Proceedings
EditorsMatteo Baldoni, Katsutoshi Hirayama, Paolo Torroni, Tran Cao Son, Amit K. Chopra
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages181-196
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9783319448312
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2016
Event19th International Conference on Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2016 - Phuket, Thailand
Duration: Aug 22 2016Aug 26 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9862 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other19th International Conference on Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2016
CountryThailand
CityPhuket
Period8/22/168/26/16

Fingerprint

Social Choice
Alternatives
Choose
Rationality
Strategy
Subset

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Guo, M., Sakurai, Y., Todo, T., & Yokoo, M. (2016). Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets. In M. Baldoni, K. Hirayama, P. Torroni, T. C. Son, & A. K. Chopra (Eds.), Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 19th International Conference, PRIMA 2016, Proceedings (pp. 181-196). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9862 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11

Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets. / Guo, Mingyu; Sakurai, Yuko; Todo, Taiki; Yokoo, Makoto.

Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 19th International Conference, PRIMA 2016, Proceedings. ed. / Matteo Baldoni; Katsutoshi Hirayama; Paolo Torroni; Tran Cao Son; Amit K. Chopra. Springer Verlag, 2016. p. 181-196 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9862 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Guo, M, Sakurai, Y, Todo, T & Yokoo, M 2016, Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets. in M Baldoni, K Hirayama, P Torroni, TC Son & AK Chopra (eds), Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 19th International Conference, PRIMA 2016, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9862 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 181-196, 19th International Conference on Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2016, Phuket, Thailand, 8/22/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11
Guo M, Sakurai Y, Todo T, Yokoo M. Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets. In Baldoni M, Hirayama K, Torroni P, Son TC, Chopra AK, editors, Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 19th International Conference, PRIMA 2016, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2016. p. 181-196. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11
Guo, Mingyu ; Sakurai, Yuko ; Todo, Taiki ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets. Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 19th International Conference, PRIMA 2016, Proceedings. editor / Matteo Baldoni ; Katsutoshi Hirayama ; Paolo Torroni ; Tran Cao Son ; Amit K. Chopra. Springer Verlag, 2016. pp. 181-196 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
@inproceedings{f5ccb819415b4ffca07eeace86fd66ef,
title = "Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets",
abstract = "We consider a social choice problem where individual rationality is required. The status quo belongs to the outcome space, and the selected alternative must be weakly better than the status quo for everybody. If the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the alternatives, we obtain a negative result: any individually rational (IR) and strategy-proof (SP) mechanism can choose at most one alternative (besides the status quo), regardless of the preferences. To overcome this negative result, we consider a domain where the alternatives have a known structure, i.e., an agent is indifferent between the status quo and a subset of the outcomes. This set is exogenously given and public information. This assumption is natural if the social choice involves the participation of agents. For example, consider a group of people organizing a trip where participation is voluntary. We can assume each agent is indifferent between the trip plans in which she does not participate and the status quo (i.e., no trip). In this setting, we obtain more positive results: we develop a class of mechanisms called Approve and Choose mechanisms, which are IR and SP, and can choose multiple alternatives as well as the status quo.",
author = "Mingyu Guo and Yuko Sakurai and Taiki Todo and Makoto Yokoo",
year = "2016",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319448312",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
pages = "181--196",
editor = "Matteo Baldoni and Katsutoshi Hirayama and Paolo Torroni and Son, {Tran Cao} and Chopra, {Amit K.}",
booktitle = "Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 19th International Conference, PRIMA 2016, Proceedings",
address = "Germany",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets

AU - Guo, Mingyu

AU - Sakurai, Yuko

AU - Todo, Taiki

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

PY - 2016/1/1

Y1 - 2016/1/1

N2 - We consider a social choice problem where individual rationality is required. The status quo belongs to the outcome space, and the selected alternative must be weakly better than the status quo for everybody. If the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the alternatives, we obtain a negative result: any individually rational (IR) and strategy-proof (SP) mechanism can choose at most one alternative (besides the status quo), regardless of the preferences. To overcome this negative result, we consider a domain where the alternatives have a known structure, i.e., an agent is indifferent between the status quo and a subset of the outcomes. This set is exogenously given and public information. This assumption is natural if the social choice involves the participation of agents. For example, consider a group of people organizing a trip where participation is voluntary. We can assume each agent is indifferent between the trip plans in which she does not participate and the status quo (i.e., no trip). In this setting, we obtain more positive results: we develop a class of mechanisms called Approve and Choose mechanisms, which are IR and SP, and can choose multiple alternatives as well as the status quo.

AB - We consider a social choice problem where individual rationality is required. The status quo belongs to the outcome space, and the selected alternative must be weakly better than the status quo for everybody. If the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the alternatives, we obtain a negative result: any individually rational (IR) and strategy-proof (SP) mechanism can choose at most one alternative (besides the status quo), regardless of the preferences. To overcome this negative result, we consider a domain where the alternatives have a known structure, i.e., an agent is indifferent between the status quo and a subset of the outcomes. This set is exogenously given and public information. This assumption is natural if the social choice involves the participation of agents. For example, consider a group of people organizing a trip where participation is voluntary. We can assume each agent is indifferent between the trip plans in which she does not participate and the status quo (i.e., no trip). In this setting, we obtain more positive results: we develop a class of mechanisms called Approve and Choose mechanisms, which are IR and SP, and can choose multiple alternatives as well as the status quo.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84984846580&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84984846580&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84984846580

SN - 9783319448312

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 181

EP - 196

BT - Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 19th International Conference, PRIMA 2016, Proceedings

A2 - Baldoni, Matteo

A2 - Hirayama, Katsutoshi

A2 - Torroni, Paolo

A2 - Son, Tran Cao

A2 - Chopra, Amit K.

PB - Springer Verlag

ER -