Influence of stochastic perturbation of both action updating and strategy updating in mixed-strategy 2 × 2 games on evolution of cooperation

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Abstract

In a mixed-strategy game framework, each agent's strategy is defined by a real number; on the other hand, in a discrete strategy game framework, only binary strategies, either cooperation or defection, are allowed. In a spatial mixed-strategy game, with respect to the process for updating action (offer), either a synchronous or an asynchronous strategy update should be presumed. This study elucidates how stochastic perturbation that results from a synchronous or an asynchronous process for updating action significantly affects the enhancement of cooperation in an evolutionary process. Especially, when a synchronous process for updating action is assumed, the extent of cooperation increases with an increase in degree.

Original languageEnglish
Article number062149
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume88
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 30 2013

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

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