Abstract
Both ancillary and primary benefits, generated by climate change mitigation, are indispensable key factors to implement the full participation in international environmental agreement (IEA). This paper presents a new IEA model with ancillary benefits, using a repeated game with the linear and quadratic emission abatement cost functions of each country. This study also investigates the effect of ancillary benefits on the condition for full participation in IEA. Ancillary benefits function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. Our main results show that ancillary benefits can facilitate full participation in IEA, thus suggesting that they should be considered in climate change negotiations.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 312-320 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Economic Modelling |
| Volume | 61 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 1 2017 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits : Repeated games analysis. / Takashima, Nobuyuki.
In: Economic Modelling, Vol. 61, 01.02.2017, p. 312-320.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits
T2 - Repeated games analysis
AU - Takashima, Nobuyuki
PY - 2017/2/1
Y1 - 2017/2/1
N2 - Both ancillary and primary benefits, generated by climate change mitigation, are indispensable key factors to implement the full participation in international environmental agreement (IEA). This paper presents a new IEA model with ancillary benefits, using a repeated game with the linear and quadratic emission abatement cost functions of each country. This study also investigates the effect of ancillary benefits on the condition for full participation in IEA. Ancillary benefits function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. Our main results show that ancillary benefits can facilitate full participation in IEA, thus suggesting that they should be considered in climate change negotiations.
AB - Both ancillary and primary benefits, generated by climate change mitigation, are indispensable key factors to implement the full participation in international environmental agreement (IEA). This paper presents a new IEA model with ancillary benefits, using a repeated game with the linear and quadratic emission abatement cost functions of each country. This study also investigates the effect of ancillary benefits on the condition for full participation in IEA. Ancillary benefits function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. Our main results show that ancillary benefits can facilitate full participation in IEA, thus suggesting that they should be considered in climate change negotiations.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85007470965&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85007470965&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.10.011
DO - 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.10.011
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85007470965
VL - 61
SP - 312
EP - 320
JO - Economic Modelling
JF - Economic Modelling
SN - 0264-9993
ER -