International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits: Repeated games analysis

Nobuyuki Takashima

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Both ancillary and primary benefits, generated by climate change mitigation, are indispensable key factors to implement the full participation in international environmental agreement (IEA). This paper presents a new IEA model with ancillary benefits, using a repeated game with the linear and quadratic emission abatement cost functions of each country. This study also investigates the effect of ancillary benefits on the condition for full participation in IEA. Ancillary benefits function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. Our main results show that ancillary benefits can facilitate full participation in IEA, thus suggesting that they should be considered in climate change negotiations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)312-320
Number of pages9
JournalEconomic Modelling
Volume61
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 1 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits: Repeated games analysis'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this