International standards for intellectual property protection and R & D incentives

Reiko Aoki, Thomas J. Prusa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the effect of alternative standards for intellectual property protection. Uniform protection, based on the GATT principle of non-discrimination, provides domestic and foreign firms with the same level of protection. Discriminatory protection, based on Section 337 of the U.S. trade laws provides different levels of protection depending upon where the firm is located. We show that discriminatory protection may not increase (and may decrease) domestic R & D. The effect of asymmetric patent protection depends on whether the rivals have pre-existing products, on the costs of R & D, and on the value of the potential innovation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)251-273
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of International Economics
Volume35
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 1993

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International standards
Incentives
Intellectual property
Costs
Patent protection
Domestic firms
Non-discrimination
Foreign firms
Innovation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

International standards for intellectual property protection and R & D incentives. / Aoki, Reiko; Prusa, Thomas J.

In: Journal of International Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3-4, 01.01.1993, p. 251-273.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Aoki, Reiko ; Prusa, Thomas J. / International standards for intellectual property protection and R & D incentives. In: Journal of International Economics. 1993 ; Vol. 35, No. 3-4. pp. 251-273.
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