K-coalitional cooperative games

Oskar Skibski, Szymon Matejczyk, Tomasz P. Michalak, Michael Wooldridge, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In most previous models of coalition structure generation, it is assumed that agents may partition themselves into any coalition structure. In practice, however, there may be physical and organizational constraints that limit the number of co-existing coalitions. In this paper, we introduce k-coalitional games: a type of partition function game especially designed to model such situations. We propose an extension of the Shapley value for these games, and study its axiomatic and computational properties. In particular, we show that, under some conditions, it can be computed in polynomial time given two existing representations of coalitional games with externalities. Finally, we use k-coalitional games to analyse the relative importance of geographical locations in the game of Diplomacy.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages177-185
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781450342391
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2016
Event15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: May 9 2016May 13 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Other

Other15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
CountrySingapore
CitySingapore
Period5/9/165/13/16

Fingerprint

Polynomials

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Skibski, O., Matejczyk, S., Michalak, T. P., Wooldridge, M., & Yokoo, M. (2016). K-coalitional cooperative games. In AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (pp. 177-185). (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

K-coalitional cooperative games. / Skibski, Oskar; Matejczyk, Szymon; Michalak, Tomasz P.; Wooldridge, Michael; Yokoo, Makoto.

AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2016. p. 177-185 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Skibski, O, Matejczyk, S, Michalak, TP, Wooldridge, M & Yokoo, M 2016, K-coalitional cooperative games. in AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 177-185, 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016, Singapore, Singapore, 5/9/16.
Skibski O, Matejczyk S, Michalak TP, Wooldridge M, Yokoo M. K-coalitional cooperative games. In AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). 2016. p. 177-185. (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).
Skibski, Oskar ; Matejczyk, Szymon ; Michalak, Tomasz P. ; Wooldridge, Michael ; Yokoo, Makoto. / K-coalitional cooperative games. AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2016. pp. 177-185 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).
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