License scheme: An optimal waste management policy under asymmetric information

Takayoshi Shinkuma, Shunsuke Managi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A system requiring a waste management license from an enforcement agency has been introduced in many countries. A license system is usually coupled with fines, a manifest, and a disposal tax. However, these policy devices have not been integrated into an optimal policy. In this paper we derive an optimal waste management policy by using those policy devices. Waste management policies are met with three difficult problems: asymmetric information, the heterogeneity of waste management firms, and non-compliance by waste management firms and waste disposers. The optimal policy in this paper overcomes all three problems.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)143-168
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Regulatory Economics
Volume39
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 1 2011

Fingerprint

License
Waste management
Asymmetric information
Optimal policy
Tax
Integrated
Noncompliance
Enforcement
Disposal

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

License scheme : An optimal waste management policy under asymmetric information. / Shinkuma, Takayoshi; Managi, Shunsuke.

In: Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 39, No. 2, 01.03.2011, p. 143-168.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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