Abstract
Several methods exist for electing committees of representatives and conducting multiple referenda based on approval voting. Recently, a family of rules for approval-based voting using ordered weighted averaging was proposed in [1], ranging from a simple candidate-wise majority (minisum) to egalitarian rule (minimax). Even though the first rule is strategyproof and the second is not, due to its egalitarian nature, only a partial study on manipulation has been conducted for inbetween rules. This paper investigates the maiiipulability of fair rules within this family. We first prove that all rules parameterized by fair (non-increasing) weight vectors are manipulable, except minisum, if we consider them either resolute with a tie-breaking mechanism or irresolute with classic extension principles. Then, we conduct an empirical study of the proportion of elections that are manipulable, showing that it increases based on the rule's fairness.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 |
| Editors | Edmund Durfee, Sanmay Das, Kate Larson, Michael Winikoff |
| Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |
| Pages | 597-605 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Volume | 1 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781510855076 |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 1 2017 |
| Event | 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 - Sao Paulo, Brazil Duration: May 8 2017 → May 12 2017 |
Other
| Other | 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 |
|---|---|
| Country | Brazil |
| City | Sao Paulo |
| Period | 5/8/17 → 5/12/17 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering
Cite this
Manipulation of hamming-based approval voting for multiple referenda and committee elections. / Barrot, Nathanael; Lang, Jérôme; Yokoo, Makoto.
16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017. ed. / Edmund Durfee; Sanmay Das; Kate Larson; Michael Winikoff. Vol. 1 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2017. p. 597-605.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Manipulation of hamming-based approval voting for multiple referenda and committee elections
AU - Barrot, Nathanael
AU - Lang, Jérôme
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - Several methods exist for electing committees of representatives and conducting multiple referenda based on approval voting. Recently, a family of rules for approval-based voting using ordered weighted averaging was proposed in [1], ranging from a simple candidate-wise majority (minisum) to egalitarian rule (minimax). Even though the first rule is strategyproof and the second is not, due to its egalitarian nature, only a partial study on manipulation has been conducted for inbetween rules. This paper investigates the maiiipulability of fair rules within this family. We first prove that all rules parameterized by fair (non-increasing) weight vectors are manipulable, except minisum, if we consider them either resolute with a tie-breaking mechanism or irresolute with classic extension principles. Then, we conduct an empirical study of the proportion of elections that are manipulable, showing that it increases based on the rule's fairness.
AB - Several methods exist for electing committees of representatives and conducting multiple referenda based on approval voting. Recently, a family of rules for approval-based voting using ordered weighted averaging was proposed in [1], ranging from a simple candidate-wise majority (minisum) to egalitarian rule (minimax). Even though the first rule is strategyproof and the second is not, due to its egalitarian nature, only a partial study on manipulation has been conducted for inbetween rules. This paper investigates the maiiipulability of fair rules within this family. We first prove that all rules parameterized by fair (non-increasing) weight vectors are manipulable, except minisum, if we consider them either resolute with a tie-breaking mechanism or irresolute with classic extension principles. Then, we conduct an empirical study of the proportion of elections that are manipulable, showing that it increases based on the rule's fairness.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85046489256&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85046489256
VL - 1
SP - 597
EP - 605
BT - 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
A2 - Durfee, Edmund
A2 - Das, Sanmay
A2 - Larson, Kate
A2 - Winikoff, Michael
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
ER -