Manipulation of hamming-based approval voting for multiple referenda and committee elections

Nathanael Barrot, Jérôme Lang, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Several methods exist for electing committees of representatives and conducting multiple referenda based on approval voting. Recently, a family of rules for approval-based voting using ordered weighted averaging was proposed in [1], ranging from a simple candidate-wise majority (minisum) to egalitarian rule (minimax). Even though the first rule is strategyproof and the second is not, due to its egalitarian nature, only a partial study on manipulation has been conducted for inbetween rules. This paper investigates the maiiipulability of fair rules within this family. We first prove that all rules parameterized by fair (non-increasing) weight vectors are manipulable, except minisum, if we consider them either resolute with a tie-breaking mechanism or irresolute with classic extension principles. Then, we conduct an empirical study of the proportion of elections that are manipulable, showing that it increases based on the rule's fairness.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
EditorsEdmund Durfee, Sanmay Das, Kate Larson, Michael Winikoff
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages597-605
Number of pages9
Volume1
ISBN (Electronic)9781510855076
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2017
Event16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 - Sao Paulo, Brazil
Duration: May 8 2017May 12 2017

Other

Other16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
CountryBrazil
CitySao Paulo
Period5/8/175/12/17

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Barrot, N., Lang, J., & Yokoo, M. (2017). Manipulation of hamming-based approval voting for multiple referenda and committee elections. In E. Durfee, S. Das, K. Larson, & M. Winikoff (Eds.), 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 (Vol. 1, pp. 597-605). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

Manipulation of hamming-based approval voting for multiple referenda and committee elections. / Barrot, Nathanael; Lang, Jérôme; Yokoo, Makoto.

16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017. ed. / Edmund Durfee; Sanmay Das; Kate Larson; Michael Winikoff. Vol. 1 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2017. p. 597-605.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Barrot, N, Lang, J & Yokoo, M 2017, Manipulation of hamming-based approval voting for multiple referenda and committee elections. in E Durfee, S Das, K Larson & M Winikoff (eds), 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017. vol. 1, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 597-605, 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 5/8/17.
Barrot N, Lang J, Yokoo M. Manipulation of hamming-based approval voting for multiple referenda and committee elections. In Durfee E, Das S, Larson K, Winikoff M, editors, 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017. Vol. 1. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). 2017. p. 597-605
Barrot, Nathanael ; Lang, Jérôme ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Manipulation of hamming-based approval voting for multiple referenda and committee elections. 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017. editor / Edmund Durfee ; Sanmay Das ; Kate Larson ; Michael Winikoff. Vol. 1 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2017. pp. 597-605
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