### Abstract

Sequential allocation is one of the most fundamental models for allocating indivisible items to agents in a decentralized manner, in which agents sequentially pick their favorite items among the remainder based on a pre-defined priority ordering of agents (a sequence). In recent years, algorithmic issues about agents' manipulations have also been investigated, such as the computational complexity of verifying whether a given bundle of items is achievable and maximizing one's utility under a given additive utility function. In this paper we consider a slightly modified model, where the selection process is divided into rounds, each agent obtains exactly one item in each round, and the sequence per round is determined uniformly at random. It is natural to expect that finding a profitable manipulation is difficult even for the case of two agents, since a manipulator must consider exponentially many possible sequences with respect to the number of rounds due to randomization. To our surprise, however, an optimal manipulation can be computed without any exploration for exponentially decaying utilities. Furthermore, for general additive utilities, although some exploration is required, it can still be done in polynomial time with respect to the number of rounds.

Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |

Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |

Pages | 141-149 |

Number of pages | 9 |

ISBN (Electronic) | 9781450342391 |

Publication status | Published - Jan 1 2016 |

Event | 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore Duration: May 9 2016 → May 13 2016 |

### Publication series

Name | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
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ISSN (Print) | 1548-8403 |

ISSN (Electronic) | 1558-2914 |

### Other

Other | 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 |
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Country | Singapore |

City | Singapore |

Period | 5/9/16 → 5/13/16 |

### Fingerprint

### All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering

### Cite this

*AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems*(pp. 141-149). (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

**Manipulations in two-agent sequential allocation with random sequences.** / Tominaga, Yuto; Todov, Taiki; Yokoo, Makoto.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

*AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.*Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 141-149, 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016, Singapore, Singapore, 5/9/16.

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Manipulations in two-agent sequential allocation with random sequences

AU - Tominaga, Yuto

AU - Todov, Taiki

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

PY - 2016/1/1

Y1 - 2016/1/1

N2 - Sequential allocation is one of the most fundamental models for allocating indivisible items to agents in a decentralized manner, in which agents sequentially pick their favorite items among the remainder based on a pre-defined priority ordering of agents (a sequence). In recent years, algorithmic issues about agents' manipulations have also been investigated, such as the computational complexity of verifying whether a given bundle of items is achievable and maximizing one's utility under a given additive utility function. In this paper we consider a slightly modified model, where the selection process is divided into rounds, each agent obtains exactly one item in each round, and the sequence per round is determined uniformly at random. It is natural to expect that finding a profitable manipulation is difficult even for the case of two agents, since a manipulator must consider exponentially many possible sequences with respect to the number of rounds due to randomization. To our surprise, however, an optimal manipulation can be computed without any exploration for exponentially decaying utilities. Furthermore, for general additive utilities, although some exploration is required, it can still be done in polynomial time with respect to the number of rounds.

AB - Sequential allocation is one of the most fundamental models for allocating indivisible items to agents in a decentralized manner, in which agents sequentially pick their favorite items among the remainder based on a pre-defined priority ordering of agents (a sequence). In recent years, algorithmic issues about agents' manipulations have also been investigated, such as the computational complexity of verifying whether a given bundle of items is achievable and maximizing one's utility under a given additive utility function. In this paper we consider a slightly modified model, where the selection process is divided into rounds, each agent obtains exactly one item in each round, and the sequence per round is determined uniformly at random. It is natural to expect that finding a profitable manipulation is difficult even for the case of two agents, since a manipulator must consider exponentially many possible sequences with respect to the number of rounds due to randomization. To our surprise, however, an optimal manipulation can be computed without any exploration for exponentially decaying utilities. Furthermore, for general additive utilities, although some exploration is required, it can still be done in polynomial time with respect to the number of rounds.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85014144012&partnerID=8YFLogxK

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M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85014144012

T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

SP - 141

EP - 149

BT - AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)

ER -