Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games

David Lowing, Kevin Techer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


The search for a compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism has given rise to many discussions. In the context of cooperative games, this compromise can be understood as a trade-off between the Shapley value and the Equal division value. We investigate this compromise in the context of multi-choice games in which players have several activity levels. To do so, we propose new extensions of the Shapley value and of the Equal division value to multi-choice games. Contrary to the existing solution concepts for multi-choice games, each one of these values satisfies a Core condition introduced by Grabisch and Xie (Math Methods Oper Res 66(3):491–512, 2007), namely Multi-Efficiency. We compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism by introducing the multi-choice Egalitarian Shapley values, computed as the convex combination of our extensions. To conduct this study, we introduce new axioms for multi-choice games. This allows us to provide an axiomatic foundation for each of these values.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)815-861
Number of pages47
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2022
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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