Market power in bilateral oligopoly: Experimental evidence from emissions trading

Isamu Matsukawa, Kenta Tanaka, Shunsuke Managi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Market power in emissions trading has been extensively investigated because emerging markets for tradableemissions permits such as the European Unions Emissions Trading Scheme can be dominated by relatively fewlarge sellers or buyers. A key feature of emissions trading markets is that emissions permits are often traded bya small number of large sellers and buyers. Thus, both sellers and buyers can influence the market pricein their favor, and emissions trading markets can be considered a bilateral oligopoly model in which everytrader can exercise market power. Using data from a laboratory experiment, we examine whether a bilateral oligopoly model is appropriate for predicting market outcomes of emissions trading. Our results suggest that theoretical bilateral oligopoly models, which assume market power of all traders, could better describe market outcomes of emissions trading. The effects of the slope of the marginal abatement cost function on market power in laboratory experiments are found to be consistent with those predicted by theoretical bilateral oligopoly models. In contrast with the previous studies, our results imply that the double auction is not able tosuppress market power in emissions trading.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProgress in Economics Research
PublisherNova Science Publishers, Inc.
Pages151-175
Number of pages25
Volume31
ISBN (Electronic)9781634825153
ISBN (Print)9781634825023
Publication statusPublished - Oct 1 2015
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Market power
Bilateral oligopoly
Emissions trading
Seller
Buyers
Laboratory experiments
Double auction
Exercise
Marginal abatement costs
Emerging markets
Traders
Emission permits
Cost function
Emissions trading scheme
European Union

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Matsukawa, I., Tanaka, K., & Managi, S. (2015). Market power in bilateral oligopoly: Experimental evidence from emissions trading. In Progress in Economics Research (Vol. 31, pp. 151-175). Nova Science Publishers, Inc..

Market power in bilateral oligopoly : Experimental evidence from emissions trading. / Matsukawa, Isamu; Tanaka, Kenta; Managi, Shunsuke.

Progress in Economics Research. Vol. 31 Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2015. p. 151-175.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Matsukawa, I, Tanaka, K & Managi, S 2015, Market power in bilateral oligopoly: Experimental evidence from emissions trading. in Progress in Economics Research. vol. 31, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., pp. 151-175.
Matsukawa I, Tanaka K, Managi S. Market power in bilateral oligopoly: Experimental evidence from emissions trading. In Progress in Economics Research. Vol. 31. Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 2015. p. 151-175
Matsukawa, Isamu ; Tanaka, Kenta ; Managi, Shunsuke. / Market power in bilateral oligopoly : Experimental evidence from emissions trading. Progress in Economics Research. Vol. 31 Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2015. pp. 151-175
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