TY - JOUR
T1 - Modelling and analysing the coexistence of dual dilemmas in the proactive vaccination game and retroactive treatment game in epidemic viral dynamics
AU - Ariful Kabir, K. M.
AU - Tanimoto, Jun
N1 - Funding Information:
Data accessibility. This article has no additional data. The supplementary material provides the basic code of our study. Authors’ contributions. K.M.A.K. conceived of the presented idea and developed the theory and performed the computations. J.T. encouraged K.M.A.K. to investigate and supervised the findings of this work. All authors discussed the results and contributed to the final manuscript. Competing interests. We declare we have no competing interests. Funding. This study was partially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from JSPS, Japan, KAKENHI (grant nos JP 18K18924 and JP 19KK0262), SCAT (Support Center for Advanced Telecommunications Technology) Research Foundation and Kurata Grant awarded to J.T. Acknowledgements. We would like to express our gratitude to the funders.
PY - 2019/12/1
Y1 - 2019/12/1
N2 - The dynamics of a spreadable disease are largely governed by four factors: proactive vaccination, retroactive treatment, individual decisions, and the prescribing behaviour of physicians. Under the imposed vaccination policy and antiviral treatment in society, complex factors (costs and expected effects of the vaccines and treatments, and fear of being infected) trigger an emulous situation in which individuals avoid infection by the pre-emptive or ex post provision. Aside from the established voluntary vaccination game, we propose a treatment game model associated with the resistance evolution of antiviral/antibiotic overuse. Moreover, the imperfectness of vaccinations has inevitably led to anti-vaccine behaviour, necessitating a proactive treatment policy. However, under the excessively heavy implementation of treatments such as antiviral medicine, resistant strains emerge. The model explicitly exhibits a dual social dilemma situation, in which the treatment behaviour changes on a local time scale, and the vaccination uptake later evolves on a global time scale. The impact of resistance evolution and the coexistence of dual dilemmas are investigated by the control reproduction number and the social efficiency deficit, respectively.
AB - The dynamics of a spreadable disease are largely governed by four factors: proactive vaccination, retroactive treatment, individual decisions, and the prescribing behaviour of physicians. Under the imposed vaccination policy and antiviral treatment in society, complex factors (costs and expected effects of the vaccines and treatments, and fear of being infected) trigger an emulous situation in which individuals avoid infection by the pre-emptive or ex post provision. Aside from the established voluntary vaccination game, we propose a treatment game model associated with the resistance evolution of antiviral/antibiotic overuse. Moreover, the imperfectness of vaccinations has inevitably led to anti-vaccine behaviour, necessitating a proactive treatment policy. However, under the excessively heavy implementation of treatments such as antiviral medicine, resistant strains emerge. The model explicitly exhibits a dual social dilemma situation, in which the treatment behaviour changes on a local time scale, and the vaccination uptake later evolves on a global time scale. The impact of resistance evolution and the coexistence of dual dilemmas are investigated by the control reproduction number and the social efficiency deficit, respectively.
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U2 - 10.1098/rspa.2019.0484
DO - 10.1098/rspa.2019.0484
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85077443571
VL - 475
JO - Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
JF - Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
SN - 0080-4630
IS - 2232
M1 - 484
ER -