The dynamics of a spreadable disease are largely governed by four factors: proactive vaccination, retroactive treatment, individual decisions, and the prescribing behaviour of physicians. Under the imposed vaccination policy and antiviral treatment in society, complex factors (costs and expected effects of the vaccines and treatments, and fear of being infected) trigger an emulous situation in which individuals avoid infection by the pre-emptive or ex post provision. Aside from the established voluntary vaccination game, we propose a treatment game model associated with the resistance evolution of antiviral/antibiotic overuse. Moreover, the imperfectness of vaccinations has inevitably led to anti-vaccine behaviour, necessitating a proactive treatment policy. However, under the excessively heavy implementation of treatments such as antiviral medicine, resistant strains emerge. The model explicitly exhibits a dual social dilemma situation, in which the treatment behaviour changes on a local time scale, and the vaccination uptake later evolves on a global time scale. The impact of resistance evolution and the coexistence of dual dilemmas are investigated by the control reproduction number and the social efficiency deficit, respectively.
|Journal||Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences|
|Publication status||Published - Dec 1 2019|
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Physics and Astronomy(all)