Modified power-analysis attacks on XTR and an efficient countermeasure

Dong Guk Han, Tetsuya Izu, Jongin Lim, Kouichi Sakurai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In [HLS04a], Han et al. presented a nice overview of some side channel attacks (SCA), and some classical countermeasures. However, their proposed countermeasures against SCA are so inefficient that the efficiency of XTR with SCA countermeasures is at least 129 times slower than that of XTR without them. Thus they remained the construction of the efficient countermeasures against SCA as an open question. In this paper, we show that XTR can be also attacked by the modified refined power analysis (MRPA) and the modified zero-value attack (MZVA). To show validity of MRPA and MZVA on XTR, we give some numerical data of them. We propose a novel efficient countermeasure (XTR-RSE) against "SCAs": SPA, Data-bit DPA, Address-bit DPA, Doubling attack, MRPA, and MZVA. We show that XTR-RSE itself without other countermeasures is secure against all "SCAs". From our implementation results, if we compare XTR with ECC with countermeasures against "SCAs", we think XTR is as suitable to smart-cards as ECC due to the efficiency of the proposed XTR-RSE.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)305-317
Number of pages13
JournalLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3269
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2004
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Power Analysis
Countermeasures
Attack
Side Channel Attacks
Electronic crime countermeasures
Smart cards
Zero
Smart Card
Doubling
Side channel attack

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

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title = "Modified power-analysis attacks on XTR and an efficient countermeasure",
abstract = "In [HLS04a], Han et al. presented a nice overview of some side channel attacks (SCA), and some classical countermeasures. However, their proposed countermeasures against SCA are so inefficient that the efficiency of XTR with SCA countermeasures is at least 129 times slower than that of XTR without them. Thus they remained the construction of the efficient countermeasures against SCA as an open question. In this paper, we show that XTR can be also attacked by the modified refined power analysis (MRPA) and the modified zero-value attack (MZVA). To show validity of MRPA and MZVA on XTR, we give some numerical data of them. We propose a novel efficient countermeasure (XTR-RSE) against {"}SCAs{"}: SPA, Data-bit DPA, Address-bit DPA, Doubling attack, MRPA, and MZVA. We show that XTR-RSE itself without other countermeasures is secure against all {"}SCAs{"}. From our implementation results, if we compare XTR with ECC with countermeasures against {"}SCAs{"}, we think XTR is as suitable to smart-cards as ECC due to the efficiency of the proposed XTR-RSE.",
author = "Han, {Dong Guk} and Tetsuya Izu and Jongin Lim and Kouichi Sakurai",
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T1 - Modified power-analysis attacks on XTR and an efficient countermeasure

AU - Han, Dong Guk

AU - Izu, Tetsuya

AU - Lim, Jongin

AU - Sakurai, Kouichi

PY - 2004/12/1

Y1 - 2004/12/1

N2 - In [HLS04a], Han et al. presented a nice overview of some side channel attacks (SCA), and some classical countermeasures. However, their proposed countermeasures against SCA are so inefficient that the efficiency of XTR with SCA countermeasures is at least 129 times slower than that of XTR without them. Thus they remained the construction of the efficient countermeasures against SCA as an open question. In this paper, we show that XTR can be also attacked by the modified refined power analysis (MRPA) and the modified zero-value attack (MZVA). To show validity of MRPA and MZVA on XTR, we give some numerical data of them. We propose a novel efficient countermeasure (XTR-RSE) against "SCAs": SPA, Data-bit DPA, Address-bit DPA, Doubling attack, MRPA, and MZVA. We show that XTR-RSE itself without other countermeasures is secure against all "SCAs". From our implementation results, if we compare XTR with ECC with countermeasures against "SCAs", we think XTR is as suitable to smart-cards as ECC due to the efficiency of the proposed XTR-RSE.

AB - In [HLS04a], Han et al. presented a nice overview of some side channel attacks (SCA), and some classical countermeasures. However, their proposed countermeasures against SCA are so inefficient that the efficiency of XTR with SCA countermeasures is at least 129 times slower than that of XTR without them. Thus they remained the construction of the efficient countermeasures against SCA as an open question. In this paper, we show that XTR can be also attacked by the modified refined power analysis (MRPA) and the modified zero-value attack (MZVA). To show validity of MRPA and MZVA on XTR, we give some numerical data of them. We propose a novel efficient countermeasure (XTR-RSE) against "SCAs": SPA, Data-bit DPA, Address-bit DPA, Doubling attack, MRPA, and MZVA. We show that XTR-RSE itself without other countermeasures is secure against all "SCAs". From our implementation results, if we compare XTR with ECC with countermeasures against "SCAs", we think XTR is as suitable to smart-cards as ECC due to the efficiency of the proposed XTR-RSE.

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