Network reciprocity created in prisoner's dilemma games by coupling two mechanisms

Jun Tanimoto, Nobuyuki Kishimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We found that a nontrivial enhancement of network reciprocity for 2 × 2 prisoner's dilemma games can be achieved by coupling two mechanisms. The first mechanism presumes a larger strategy update neighborhood than the conventional first neighborhood on the underlying network. The second is the strategy-shifting rule. At the initial time step, the averaged cooperation extent is assumed to be 0.5. In the case of strategy shifting, an agent adopts a continuous strategy definition during the initial period of a simulation episode (when the global cooperation fraction decreases from its initial value of 0.5; that is, the enduring period). The agent then switches to a discrete strategy definition in the time period afterwards (when the global cooperation fraction begins to increase again; that is, the expanding period). We explored why this particular enhancement comes about, and to summarize, the continuous strategy during the initial period relaxes the conditions for the survival of relatively cooperative clusters, and the large strategy adaptation neighborhood allows those cooperative clusters to expand easily.

Original languageEnglish
Article number042106
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume91
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 7 2015

    Fingerprint

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

Cite this