TY - GEN
T1 - On characterizing economic-based incentive-compatible mechanisms to solving hidden information and hidden action in ad hoc network
AU - Wang, Yufeng
AU - Hori, Yoshiaki
AU - Sakurai, Kouichi
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - This paper attempts to comprehensively characterize economic-based incentive compatible routing and forwarding mechanisms in ad hoc network, including hidden information in routing phase, and hidden action in forwarding phase. By incentive compatibility it means that system designer should respect rationality of nodes, and design proper incentive mechanisms to encourage nodes to conduct something beneficial to the whole system, while nodes pursued their own utility. Firstly, based on analysis of extensive game form, we argue that, for each participant, truth-telling is the expected dominant strategy equilibrium in VCG-like routing mechanism, even under the situation of mutually dependent link cost. Then, Individual rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints are formally offered, which should be satisfied by any game theoretical routing and forwarding scheme. And different solution concepts are investigated to characterize the economic meanings of two kind forwarding approaches, that is, Nash equilibrium with no per-hop monitoring and dominant strategy equilibrium with per-hop monitoring. Finally, we discuss frugality problem in VCG-like mechanism.
AB - This paper attempts to comprehensively characterize economic-based incentive compatible routing and forwarding mechanisms in ad hoc network, including hidden information in routing phase, and hidden action in forwarding phase. By incentive compatibility it means that system designer should respect rationality of nodes, and design proper incentive mechanisms to encourage nodes to conduct something beneficial to the whole system, while nodes pursued their own utility. Firstly, based on analysis of extensive game form, we argue that, for each participant, truth-telling is the expected dominant strategy equilibrium in VCG-like routing mechanism, even under the situation of mutually dependent link cost. Then, Individual rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints are formally offered, which should be satisfied by any game theoretical routing and forwarding scheme. And different solution concepts are investigated to characterize the economic meanings of two kind forwarding approaches, that is, Nash equilibrium with no per-hop monitoring and dominant strategy equilibrium with per-hop monitoring. Finally, we discuss frugality problem in VCG-like mechanism.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-540-73549-6_38
DO - 10.1007/978-3-540-73549-6_38
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:38049061577
SN - 9783540735489
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 382
EP - 391
BT - Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing - 4th International Conference, UIC 2007, Proceedings
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 4th International Conference on Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing: Building Smart Worlds in Real and Cyber Spaces, UIC 2007
Y2 - 11 July 2007 through 13 July 2007
ER -