On characterizing economic-based incentive-compatible mechanisms to solving hidden information and hidden action in ad hoc network

Yufeng Wang, Yoshiaki Hori, Kouichi Sakurai

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

This paper attempts to comprehensively characterize economic-based incentive compatible routing and forwarding mechanisms in ad hoc network, including hidden information in routing phase, and hidden action in forwarding phase. By incentive compatibility it means that system designer should respect rationality of nodes, and design proper incentive mechanisms to encourage nodes to conduct something beneficial to the whole system, while nodes pursued their own utility. Firstly, based on analysis of extensive game form, we argue that, for each participant, truth-telling is the expected dominant strategy equilibrium in VCG-like routing mechanism, even under the situation of mutually dependent link cost. Then, Individual rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints are formally offered, which should be satisfied by any game theoretical routing and forwarding scheme. And different solution concepts are investigated to characterize the economic meanings of two kind forwarding approaches, that is, Nash equilibrium with no per-hop monitoring and dominant strategy equilibrium with per-hop monitoring. Finally, we discuss frugality problem in VCG-like mechanism.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationUbiquitous Intelligence and Computing - 4th International Conference, UIC 2007, Proceedings
Pages382-391
Number of pages10
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2007
Event4th International Conference on Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing: Building Smart Worlds in Real and Cyber Spaces, UIC 2007 - Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Duration: Jul 11 2007Jul 13 2007

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4611 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other4th International Conference on Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing: Building Smart Worlds in Real and Cyber Spaces, UIC 2007
CountryHong Kong
CityHong Kong
Period7/11/077/13/07

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Wang, Y., Hori, Y., & Sakurai, K. (2007). On characterizing economic-based incentive-compatible mechanisms to solving hidden information and hidden action in ad hoc network. In Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing - 4th International Conference, UIC 2007, Proceedings (pp. 382-391). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4611 LNCS).