On insecurity of the side channel attack countermeasure using addition-subtraction chains under distinguishability between addition and doubling

Katsuyuki Okeya, Kouichi Sakurai

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

37 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that a randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure against side channel attacks is vulnerable to SPA attack, a kind of side channel attack, under distinguishability between addition and doubling. A side channel attackis an attackthat takes advantage of information leaked during execution of a cryptographic procedure. The randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure has been proposed by Oswald-Aigner, and is a random decision inserted into computations. However, its immunity to side channel attacks is still controversial. As for timing attack, a kind of side channel attack, the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure is also vulnerable. Moreover, compared with other countermeasures against side channel attacks, the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure, after being improved to prevent side channel attacks, is much slower.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security and Privacy - 7th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2002, Proceedings
EditorsLynn Batten, Jennifer Seberry
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages420-435
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)3540438610, 9783540438618
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2002
Event7th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2002 - Melbourne, Australia
Duration: Jul 3 2002Jul 5 2002

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2384
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other7th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2002
CountryAustralia
CityMelbourne
Period7/3/027/5/02

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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  • Cite this

    Okeya, K., & Sakurai, K. (2002). On insecurity of the side channel attack countermeasure using addition-subtraction chains under distinguishability between addition and doubling. In L. Batten, & J. Seberry (Eds.), Information Security and Privacy - 7th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2002, Proceedings (pp. 420-435). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2384). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_32