On stable matchings with pairwise preferences and matroid constraints

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the following generalization of the stable matching problem. We are given a set of doctors and a set of hospitals. In the classical model, each doctor has a strict total order over the hospitals. On the other hand, in our model, each doctor has a pairwise preference over the hospitals, which was introduced by Farczadi, Georgiou, and Könemann. Roughly speaking, in a pairwise preference, transitivity does not necessarily hold, and a comparison between some hospitals is not relevant to stability. Furthermore, we generalize capacity constraints on the hospitals to matroid constraints. Especially, we focus on the situation in which we are given a master list over the doctors, and the preference list of each hospital over the doctors is derived from this master list. For this problem, we give several hardness results and polynomial-time solvable cases.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2020
EditorsBo An, Amal El Fallah Seghrouchni, Gita Sukthankar
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages584-591
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781450375184
Publication statusPublished - 2020
Event19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2020 - Virtual, Auckland, New Zealand
Duration: May 19 2020 → …

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume2020-May
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2020
CountryNew Zealand
CityVirtual, Auckland
Period5/19/20 → …

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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