On the security of pseudorandomized information-theoretically secure schemes

Koji Nuida, Goichiro Hanaoka

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Dubrov and Ishai (STOC 2006) revealed, by generalizing the notion of pseudorandom generators (PRGs), that under a computational assumption, randomness in a protocol can be replaced with pseudorandomness in an indistinguishable way for an adversary even if his algorithm has unbounded complexity. However, their argument was applied only to some special protocols. In this article, we first show that their argument is not effective for a wide class of more general protocols. Then we propose a novel evaluation technique for such indistinguishability that is based on usual PRGs and is effective for those more general protocols. Examples of such protocols include parallel computation over honest-but-curious modules, secret sharing, broadcast encryption, traitor tracing, and collusion-secure codes.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Theoretic Security - 4th International Conference, ICITS 2009, Revised Selected Papers
Pages56-73
Number of pages18
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event4th International Conference on Information Theoretic Security, ICITS 2009 - Shizuoka, Japan
Duration: Dec 3 2009Dec 6 2009

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5973 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference4th International Conference on Information Theoretic Security, ICITS 2009
CountryJapan
CityShizuoka
Period12/3/0912/6/09

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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