Pareto efficient strategy-proof school choice mechanism with minimum quotas and initial endowments

Ryoji Kurata, Naoto Hamada, Chia Ling Hsu, Takamasa Suzuki, Suguru Ueda, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper develops a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism for a school choice program called Top Trading Cycles among Representatives with Supplementary Seats (TTCR-SS). We consider a setting where minimum quotas are imposed for each school, i.e., a school is required to be assigned at least a certain number of students to operate, and the obtained matching must respect initial endowments, i.e., each student must be assigned to a school that is at least as good as her initial endowment school. Although minimum quotas are relevant in school choice programs and strategy-proofness is important to many policymakers, few existing mechanisms achieve both of them simultaneously. Furthermore, existing mechanisms require that all students consider all schools acceptable to obtain a feasible matching that respects minimum quotas and cannot guarantee Pareto efficiency. TTCR-SS is based on Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, while it is significantly extended to handle the supplementary seats of schools while respecting minimum quotas. Our simulation results show TTCR-SS is significantly better than an existing TTC-based mechanism in terms of students' welfare.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages59-67
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781450342391
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2016
Event15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: May 9 2016May 13 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Other

Other15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
CountrySingapore
CitySingapore
Period5/9/165/13/16

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Kurata, R., Hamada, N., Hsu, C. L., Suzuki, T., Ueda, S., & Yokoo, M. (2016). Pareto efficient strategy-proof school choice mechanism with minimum quotas and initial endowments. In AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (pp. 59-67). (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

Pareto efficient strategy-proof school choice mechanism with minimum quotas and initial endowments. / Kurata, Ryoji; Hamada, Naoto; Hsu, Chia Ling; Suzuki, Takamasa; Ueda, Suguru; Yokoo, Makoto.

AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2016. p. 59-67 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Kurata, R, Hamada, N, Hsu, CL, Suzuki, T, Ueda, S & Yokoo, M 2016, Pareto efficient strategy-proof school choice mechanism with minimum quotas and initial endowments. in AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 59-67, 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016, Singapore, Singapore, 5/9/16.
Kurata R, Hamada N, Hsu CL, Suzuki T, Ueda S, Yokoo M. Pareto efficient strategy-proof school choice mechanism with minimum quotas and initial endowments. In AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). 2016. p. 59-67. (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).
Kurata, Ryoji ; Hamada, Naoto ; Hsu, Chia Ling ; Suzuki, Takamasa ; Ueda, Suguru ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Pareto efficient strategy-proof school choice mechanism with minimum quotas and initial endowments. AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2016. pp. 59-67 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).
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