Pareto stable matchings under one-sided matroid constraints

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The Pareto stability is one of the solution concepts in two-sided matching markets with ties. It is known that there always exists a Pareto stable matching in the many-to-many setting. In this paper, we consider the following generalization of the Pareto stable matching problem in the many-to-many setting. Each agent v of one side has a matroid defined on the set of edges incident to v, and the set of edges assigned to v must be an independent set of this matroid. By extending the algorithm of Kamiyama for the many-to-many setting, we prove that there always exists a Pareto stable matching in this setting, and a Pareto stable matching can be found in polynomial time.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1431-1451
Number of pages21
JournalSIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Volume33
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Mathematics(all)

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