TY - JOUR
T1 - Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels
AU - Lowing, David
AU - Techer, Kevin
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their comments on our work. We thank Philippe Solal, Stéphane Gonzalez, Adriana Navarro-Ramos and Hervé Moulin for useful comments. We also thank Alexandre Skoda for inviting us to present the paper at the MDOD seminar (CES, University Paris 1), Sylvain Béal and the AFSE organizing committee for letting us present the paper at the 70th Congress of the French Economic Association, and Riccardo Saulle and the SING17 organizing committee for letting us present the paper at the 17th European Meeting on Game Theory. Financial support from GRDF (Gaz Réseau Distribution France) through the ANRT (Association Nationale Recherche Technologie) doctoral program CIFRE (Conventions Industrielles de Formation par la REcherche) is gratefully acknowledged.
Funding Information:
We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their comments on our work. We thank Philippe Solal, Stéphane Gonzalez, Adriana Navarro-Ramos and Hervé Moulin for useful comments. We also thank Alexandre Skoda for inviting us to present the paper at the MDOD seminar (CES, University Paris 1), Sylvain Béal and the AFSE organizing committee for letting us present the paper at the 70th Congress of the French Economic Association, and Riccardo Saulle and the SING17 organizing committee for letting us present the paper at the 17th European Meeting on Game Theory. Financial support from GRDF (Gaz Réseau Distribution France) through the ANRT (Association Nationale Recherche Technologie) doctoral program CIFRE (Conventions Industrielles de Formation par la REcherche) is gratefully acknowledged.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2022/10
Y1 - 2022/10
N2 - This paper analyzes cooperation situations between heterogeneous players. It considers two types of heterogeneity. First, the players are differentiated with respect to a priority structure. This structure captures asymmetries between players, which may reflect exogenous rights, different needs, merit, or hierarchical constraints. Second, each player may have different cooperation possibilities represented by a set of activity levels. To analyze these situations, we enrich the model of multi-choice games, which is a natural extension of transferable utility games, with a priority structure. A new value on the class of multi-choice games with a priority structure is introduced. To accommodate the different activity levels and the asymmetries between players, this value follows an allocation process based on a lexicographic procedure. New axioms for multi-choice games with a priority structure are introduced. These axioms endogenously determine the lexicographic procedure used to define the value. Two axiomatic characterizations of this value are provided.
AB - This paper analyzes cooperation situations between heterogeneous players. It considers two types of heterogeneity. First, the players are differentiated with respect to a priority structure. This structure captures asymmetries between players, which may reflect exogenous rights, different needs, merit, or hierarchical constraints. Second, each player may have different cooperation possibilities represented by a set of activity levels. To analyze these situations, we enrich the model of multi-choice games, which is a natural extension of transferable utility games, with a priority structure. A new value on the class of multi-choice games with a priority structure is introduced. To accommodate the different activity levels and the asymmetries between players, this value follows an allocation process based on a lexicographic procedure. New axioms for multi-choice games with a priority structure are introduced. These axioms endogenously determine the lexicographic procedure used to define the value. Two axiomatic characterizations of this value are provided.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102740
DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102740
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85134847437
SN - 0304-4068
VL - 102
JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics
JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics
M1 - 102740
ER -