Product development and the timing of information disclosure under U.S. and Japanese patent systems

Reiko Aoki, Thomas J. Prusa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the consequences of the differences in the timing of information disclosure between the U.S. and Japanese patent systems. Under the Japanese system it is possible for a firm to apply for a patent, knowing the exact specifications of a rival's patent application. In contrast, in the United States the only way a firm learns about a rival's innovation is upon the actual granting of the rival's patent. We argue that this difference enables Japanese firms to coordinate their R&D efforts better than their U.S. counterparts and that this, in turn, leads to smaller quality improvements under the Japanese system. We show that the creation/diffusion tradeoff of patents can be influenced not only by the scope and length of patent protection but also by other features of the patenting process. J. Japan. Int. Econ., September 1996, 10(3), pp. 233-249. State University of New York at Stony Brook; and State University of New York at Stony Brook, Rutgers University, and NBER.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)233-249
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of the Japanese and International Economies
Volume10
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 1996

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patent system
patent
firm
patent protection
Japan
innovation
Patents
Product development
Information disclosure
Patent system

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Product development and the timing of information disclosure under U.S. and Japanese patent systems. / Aoki, Reiko; Prusa, Thomas J.

In: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Vol. 10, No. 3, 01.01.1996, p. 233-249.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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