Abstract
We examine the underpricing of 2,131 Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the local government (local SOEs) offer significantly higher underpricing when they go public than SOEs controlled by the central government and non-SOEs do. This phenomenon is evident for local SOEs from less developed provinces, after controlling for the direct effect of regional economic performance. These results suggest local government officials underprice initial public offerings to make regional companies successfully go public to promote the regional economy.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 274-285 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Economic Modelling |
| Volume | 86 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Accepted/In press - Jan 1 2019 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Provincial economic performance and underpricing of IPOs : Evidence from political interventions in China. / Liu, Jianlei; Uchida, Konari; Li, Yuan.
In: Economic Modelling, Vol. 86, 03.2020, p. 274-285.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Provincial economic performance and underpricing of IPOs
T2 - Evidence from political interventions in China
AU - Liu, Jianlei
AU - Uchida, Konari
AU - Li, Yuan
PY - 2019/1/1
Y1 - 2019/1/1
N2 - We examine the underpricing of 2,131 Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the local government (local SOEs) offer significantly higher underpricing when they go public than SOEs controlled by the central government and non-SOEs do. This phenomenon is evident for local SOEs from less developed provinces, after controlling for the direct effect of regional economic performance. These results suggest local government officials underprice initial public offerings to make regional companies successfully go public to promote the regional economy.
AB - We examine the underpricing of 2,131 Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the local government (local SOEs) offer significantly higher underpricing when they go public than SOEs controlled by the central government and non-SOEs do. This phenomenon is evident for local SOEs from less developed provinces, after controlling for the direct effect of regional economic performance. These results suggest local government officials underprice initial public offerings to make regional companies successfully go public to promote the regional economy.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85073148073&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econmod.2019.09.055
DO - 10.1016/j.econmod.2019.09.055
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85073148073
VL - 86
SP - 274
EP - 285
JO - Economic Modelling
JF - Economic Modelling
SN - 0264-9993
ER -