Abstract
We examine the underpricing of 2,131 Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the local government (local SOEs) offer significantly higher underpricing when they go public than SOEs controlled by the central government and non-SOEs do. This phenomenon is evident for local SOEs from less developed provinces, after controlling for the direct effect of regional economic performance. These results suggest local government officials underprice initial public offerings to make regional companies successfully go public to promote the regional economy.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 274-285 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Economic Modelling |
Volume | 86 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2020 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics