Public key replacement and universal forgery of SCLS scheme

Mingwu Zhang, Jintao Yao, Chunzhi Wang, Tsuyoshi Takagi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

certicatelesscryptography eliminates the need of certicates in the PKI and solves the inherent key escrow problem in the ID-based cryptography. Recently, Du and Wen proposed a short certicateless signature scheme (SCLS) without MapToPoint hash function, and the signature size is short enough with only half of the DSA signature. In this paper, after the detailing the formal of certicateless signature scheme, we show that the Du-Wen's short certicateless signature scheme is insecure that is broken by a type-I adversary who has the ability in replacing users' public keys and accessing to the signing oracles, and also cannot resist on the universal forgery attack for any third user.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)133-138
Number of pages6
JournalInternational Journal of Network Security
Volume15
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2013

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Zhang, M., Yao, J., Wang, C., & Takagi, T. (2013). Public key replacement and universal forgery of SCLS scheme. International Journal of Network Security, 15(2), 133-138.