Quality-improving R&D and merger policy in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot and Bertrand equilibria

Nobuyuki Takashima, Yasunori Ouchida

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We combine a model of product research and development (R&D) and technological spillover with the concept of technological distance and examine horizontal mergers in a duopolistic market with R&D. The results are fourfold. First, a merger can better encourage R&D investment than the competition case. Second, with a small degree of product differentiation (PD), the merger criterion under the Cournot duopoly is stricter than that of the Bertrand case. By contrast, with a moderate or large degree of PD, the opposite is true. Third, with a small technological distance, a merger should be allowable. Finally, with a small degree of PD and moderate technological distance, a merger should be allowable.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1338-1348
Number of pages11
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Volume41
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 1 2020

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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