Referring to the social performance promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

Keizo Shigaki, Jun Tanimoto, Zhen Wang, Satoshi Kokubo, Aya Hagishima, Naoki Ikegaya

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

80 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose a new pairwise Fermi updating rule by considering a social average payoff when an agent copies a neighbor's strategy. In the update rule, a focal agent compares her payoff with the social average payoff of the same strategy that her pairwise opponent has. This concept might be justified by the fact that people reference global and, somehow, statistical information, not local information when imitating social behaviors. We presume several possible ways for the social average. Simulation results prove that the social average of some limited agents realizes more significant cooperation than that of the entire population.

Original languageEnglish
Article number031141
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume86
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 26 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

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